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I. INTRODUCTION
The public outcry witnessed in the fall of 2006 over a planned book and

television deal featuring Orenthal James ("O.J.") Simpson' thrust the
decade-old controversy back into the media spotlight.'
The book and
interview, both titled, Ifl Did It, detailed how Simpson hypothetically would

have killed his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ron
Goldman.3 After a week of protests from the victims' families, advertisers,
booksellers, and television station affiliates, News Corporation chairman and
CEO Rupert Murdoch announced the cancellation of the book and television
interview. 4 However, the story served to revive Americans' fascination with

1. See GILBERT GElS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD AND
LOEB TO O.J. SIMPSON 171 (Northwestern University Press 1998). A celebrated college athlete,
Simpson won the Heisman trophy as a football player at the University of Southern California. Id.
Following college, Simpson played football professionally in the National Football League. id. For
nine years, he was a running back for the Buffalo Bills, followed by a two-year stint with the San
Francisco '49ers. Id. Upon his retirement, he was inducted into the National Football Hall of Fame.
Id. Simpson spent his post-football years appearing in commercials and working as a sports
commentator. Id.
2. See Martin Miller, Meg James & Gina Piccalo, Simpson Book, TV Plan Dropped, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at Al.
3. Robin Abcarian & Martin Miller, Simpson to Tell How He Could Have Killed Pair, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at BI, available at http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/la-mesimpsonl6novl6,0,4376301.story?coll=la-home-headlines.
The book, titled If I Did It, was
scheduled to be released November 30, 2006, by ReganBooks, an imprint of the News Corp.-owned
HarperCollins. Id. In addition, a two-part interview with Simpson was to air on November 27 and
29, as a precursor to the book release. Id. Conducted by the book's publisher, Judith Regan, the
interview was scheduled to be shown on the Fox network, also a division of News Corp. Id. A
November 15, 2006 press release by Fox promoted the television special this way:
O.J. Simpson, in his own words, tells for the first time how he would have committed the
murders if he were the one responsible for the crimes. In the two-part event, Simpson
describes how he would have carried out the murders he has vehemently denied
committing for over a decade.
O.J. Simpson to Tell Fox How He Would Have Killed Slain Wife Nicole, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 15,
2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,229504,00.html.
A statement
released
by
HarperCollins promised the book would give a "bone-chilling account of the night of the murders."
Abcarian & Miller, supra.
4. See Miller et al., supra note 2. The Brown and Goldman families expressed outrage at news
of the book and television special. See Abcarian & Miller, supra note 3. Denise Brown, the sister of
Nicole, released a statement: "It's unfortunate that Simpson has decided to awaken a nightmare that
we have painfully endured and worked so hard to move beyond. We hope Ms. Regan takes full
accountability for promoting the wrongdoing of criminals and leveraging this forum and the actions
of Simpson to commercialize abuse." Id. Fred Goldman similarly voiced his disgust: "It is an alltime low for television. To imagine that a major network would put a murderer on TV to have him
tell how he would murder the mother of his children and my son is beyond comprehension." Id. In
the days following the announcement, Fred Goldman created an online petition to encourage a
boycott of the project. Miller et al., supra note 2. Fred Goldman also appeared on Larry King Live
and criticized Simpson, Regan, and the Fox network. Id. In addition to the opposition voiced by the
victims' families, bookstores were split as to whether to order the book for their stores. See U.S.
Booksellers Mixed on Stocking O.J. Simpson Book, Nov. 18, 2006, http://in.news.yahoo.com/
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Simpson, as well as to reignite the outrage that has followed him since his

criminal trial.'
On October 3, 1995, an estimated 150 million people watched as

Simpson was acquitted of the murders of Nicole Brown 6 and Ron Goldman 7
in one of the twentieth century's most highly publicized cases. 8 This "trial
of the century," as it was dubbed, was the longest trial ever held in

061118/137/69hi5.html. While some independent stores refused to sell the book, others decided
they would only order it upon customer request. Id. Still other sellers promised to offer limited
copies and donate the proceeds. Id. Borders Group, consisting of subsidiaries Borders Inc. and
Walden Book Co., Inc. announced it would donate any profits to charities serving domestic violence
victims. Id. Opposition also came from television stations throughout the country. Miller et al.,
supra note 2. More than a dozen of Fox's affiliates refused to air the interview, including stations in
Mobile, Alabama; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Toledo, Ohio; Providence, Rhode Island; Fresno,
California; Omaha, Nebraska; Lincoln, Nebraska; and Bismarck-Minot, North Dakota. See Jim
Benson & Caroline Palmer, More Fox Affiliates Drop O.J. Simpson: IfI Did It, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Nov. 20, 2006, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6393289.html.
The public
outcry resulted in the cancellation of the book on November 20, 2006. Miller et al., supra note 2. In
a statement issued by News Corp., Murdoch remarked, "I and senior management agree with the
American public that this was an ill-conceived project. We are sorry for any pain this has caused the
families of Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson." Id. This move, virtually unheard of in the
publishing world, meant thousands of copies of the book kept in warehouses would be destroyed and
books already at bookstores would be recalled. Id. The television special also was not aired. Id. In
the wake of the cancellation of the Simpson book and television special, HarperCollins announced
the firing of Regan. Edward Wyatt, Editor Fired After Uproar Over Simpson, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/16/business/media/16book.html?ex=1323925200&en=
3f3db5a0a 595365f&ei=5088. Regan defended her decision to publish the book because she
believed she had extracted a confession from Simpson to his former wife's murder. Id. Speculation
quickly arose over Regan's firing, which senior executives at News Corp. said resulted from an
accumulation of her behavior. Josh Getlin & Sallie Hofmeister, 'Offensive' Phone Call by Publisher
Preceded Her Firing,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at BI. In addition to the Simpson fiasco, a wave
of negative publicity arose over a new Mickey Mantle book Regan was publishing. Id. Titled "7:
The Mickey Mantle Novel," the book described sexual activity and other inflammatory episodes told
in the former New York Yankees' voice. Wyatt, supra. An offensive phone call immediately
preceding her firing was the final act resulting in her termination. Getlin & Hofmeister, supra.
5. See Many Women Outraged at O.J. Verdict, CNN.CoM, October 4, 1995,
http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/daily/9510/10-04/womenreact/index.html (describing the protest by
women's groups, including the National Organization for Women, following O.J. Simpson's
acquittal because of the abuse suffered by Nicole Brown).
6. See GEIS & BIENEN, supra note 1, at 171. Simpson met Nicole Brown when she was an
eighteen-year-old waitress at a Beverly Hills nightclub. Id. The two dated for a year, then lived
together for six years before finally marrying in 1985. Id. A rocky marriage led to a series of
separations and reconciliations for the couple that ultimately ended in divorce in 1992. Id.
7. See id. at 169. Ron Goldman was a waiter at Mezzaluna, an Italian restaurant where Nicole
had dined on the evening of the murders. Id. At the time he was killed, Goldman was returning a
pair of sunglasses Nicole's mother had dropped in front of the restaurant. Id.
8. See Sam Allis, 10 Years Later, 'Frontline' Puts O.J. Verdict in Sharp Perspective, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.boston.com/ae/tv/articles/2005/10/04/I0-years-later-frontline_
puts_oj_verdictjinsharp-perspective/.
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California, lasting nine months 9 and costing an estimated $15 million to

fight and defend.'° The trial participants were numerous: in addition to the
150 witnesses who were called, eleven lawyers represented Simpson and
twenty-five prosecutors worked on the case. "
The trial captivated the nation in a manner rivaling the Scopes "Monkey
Trial"' 2 and the Lindbergh kidnapping trial.' 3 Americans were glued to

9. Thomas Jones, The O.J.Simpson Murder Trial: Prologue,CRIMELIBRARY.COM, http:/]www.
crimelibrary.com/notorious murders/famous/simpson/index l.html?link=eaf (last visited Oct. 12,
2007).
10. See GElS & BIENEN, supra note 1,at 171. The expenditures for the prosecution were
estimated at $9 million, including $2.6 million for housing, food, and other expenses related to jury
sequestration. Id. In addition, the defense costs were approximately $6 million. Id.
11. Jones, supra note 9. Simpson assembled what came to be called the "Dream Team" of
criminal defense attorneys. Defense SuperstarJohnnie Cochran Dead at 67, MSNBC.coM, Mar.
30, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7330234/ [hereinafter Cochran Dead]. It consisted of F.
Lee Bailey, Johnnie Cochran, Alan Dershowitz, Barry Scheck, and Robert Shapiro, among others.
See id. The defense argued Simpson had been the victim of planted evidence used by police in an
attempt to frame the football star. Id. Marcia Clark and Christopher Darden spearheaded the efforts
to convict Simpson. See GElS & BIENEN, supra note 1,at 179-80.
12. University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law professor Douglas Linder believes the
"trial of the century" was not Simpson's murder trial, but rather the Scopes Trial in Dayton,
Tennessee.
See Douglas Linder, Trial of the Century?, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/scopes/century.html [hereinafter Trial of the Century] (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
The 1925 case of State v. John Scopes, better known as the "Scopes Monkey Trial," involved the
arrest of high school teacher John Scopes for teaching evolution in Tennessee schools. See Edward
W. Knappman, John Thomas Scopes Trial: 1925 (The "Monkey Trial'), in I GREAT AMERICAN
TRIALS 545, 546 (Edward W. Knappman ed., 2d ed., 2002). Scopes' actions violated the Butler Act,
a state law outlawing the teaching in public schools of "any theory that denies the story of the divine
creation of man as taught in the Bible, and [teaching] instead that man has descended from a lower
order of animals." 1d. The trial became a media circus as newspaper editors sent reporters to cover
the events. Id. at 547. Dozens of additional telegraph lines had to be strung to accommodate the
influx of media. Id. After the trial earned the nickname the "Monkey Trial," souvenirs such as
monkey dolls and umbrellas with monkey handles were sold. See id. at 546-47. The case positioned
the famed William Jennings Bryan against legendary defense attorney Clarence Darrow, with
Darrow representing Scopes. Id. at 546. "The Scopes trial produced what the New York Times
called 'the most amazing courtroom scene in Anglo-American history,"' when Darrow called
prosecutor Bryan to the stand and examined him for nearly two hours on whether stories in the Bible
were literally true. Trial of the Century, supra. To add to the drama, the theatrics occurred on the
lawn before thousands of onlookers because the judge feared the weight of the spectators might
cause the courtroom floor to cave in. Id. Linder compares the significance of the Simpson and
Scopes trials:
The main significance of the Simpson trial is as a lesson for judges and prosecutors in
how not to conduct a trial ....The Scopes Trial, on the other hand, was about ideas. It
was about whether Science and Religion could be reconciled. It was a symbolic struggle
for America's culture between the forces of Traditionalism and the forces of Modernism.
It was about whether we look for guidance from, as Bryan said "the faith of our fathers,"
or from our own intellects.
Id.
13. The trial of Richard "Bruno" Hauptmann, the accused kidnapper of aviator Charles
Lindbergh's child, has been called "the greatest story since the Resurrection" by journalist
H. L. Mencken.
See Douglas Linder, The Bruno Hauptmann (Lindbergh Kidnapping)
Trial, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Hauptmann/Hauptmann.htm
[hereinafter
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their television sets as they watched the events unfold before them each
day. 14 The unprecedented amount of media coverage of the case further
fueled the public's fascination. Two thousand reporters covered the trial,
representing twenty-three newspapers and magazines, nineteen television
stations, and eight radio stations. 15 The Los Angeles Times alone published
over 1,000 articles about the trial. 16
As the trial progressed, Judge Lance Ito, 17 prosecutors Marcia Clark" 8
and Christopher Darden,' 9 defense attorney Johnnie Cochran, 20 and

Hauptmann Trial] (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr. was taken from the
Lindbergh home on March 1, 1932. GElS & BIENEN, supra note 1, at 92. A nationwide search
ensued followed by ransom negotiations with the kidnappers. See id. at 92-97. Finally, on May 12,
1932, the corpse was found a few miles from the Lindbergh's home. Id. at 97. In 1935, three years
after the abduction, the nation watched as Hauptmann was tried in New Jersey. Id. at 104. A sense
of the media frenzy accompanying the trial was expressed by lawyer Francis X. Busch:
The kidnapping and killing of the Lindbergh baby stirred the emotions of the American
public as no other crime has done in the last fifty years. From one end of the country to
the other, fathers and mothers shared the anxiety of the beloved and distracted parents
during the supposed negotiations for their child's safe return. When, after more than two
years, the culprit was discovered and put on trial, the day-to-day proceedings in the little
old courthouse at Flemington, New Jersey, claimed top priority in every newspaper and
news radio program in the nation.
Id. at 90-91.
14. The interest in the trial was due at least in part to Simpson's status as a famed football player
and celebrity. Dr. Todd Boyd of the University of Southern California remarks, "It's a case that had
everything. There's multiple murders. There's a famous former football player, who had become
and [sic] actor. You know, there are drugs, there's sex, there's violence." The O.J. Case 10 Years
Later, CBSNEwS.COM, June 11, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/1 I/national/
main622502.shtml [hereinafter 10 Years]. The trial also sparked discussions about domestic
violence, race relations, and the role of celebrity and the media in court cases. Id.
15. Jones, supra note 9.
16. id.
17. A Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge, Ito presided over the Simpson criminal trial.
Howard Chua-Eoan & Elizabeth Gleick, Making the Case, TIME.COM, Oct. 16, 1995,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983569,00.html. He became the subject of many
jokes as the trial quickly turned into a media circus. See id. For example, Tonight Show host Jay
Leno developed the "Dancing Itos" as a form of parody of the judge. Id.
18. See Marsha [sic] Clark, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/Clark.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (giving biography of Clark). Clark had worked at the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office since 1981 when she was assigned to the Simpson case. Id.
Following the trial, she resigned and wrote a book about her experiences.
Some Who
Helped Shape the O.J. Simpson Case, USA Today, Jan. 28, 1997, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/index/nns 182.htm.
19. Darden was a thirteen-year veteran of the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office.
Andrea Ford & Henry Weinstein, D.A. Forced to Beef Up His A-Team Simpson Case: Facedwith an
Imposing Defense, Garcetti has Committed 11 People. Latest was prosecutor in Cowlings Probe,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at BI. Prior to the Simpson trial, he worked in the Special
Investigations Division which investigates public employees, such as police officers, charged with
criminal acts. Id. Following the trial, he left the District Attorney's Office and became a professor

detective Mark Fuhrman 2' became household names to many Americans. A
survey taken at the time of the trial revealed seventy-four percent of people
knew Kato Kaelin, while only a mere twenty-five percent could identify the
viewers, "If we
Vice President.22 In addition, Larry King famously told his
23
had God booked and O.J. was available, we'd move God.,
The Simpson saga did not end with the acquittal in the criminal case.
During the murder trial, the Goldman and Brown families filed wrongful
death and survival suits in civil court asking for damages to compensate
them for the loss of their loved ones. 2 4 On February 4, 1997, a civil jury

at Southwestern University School of Law. Paul Feldman, Simpson Trial Puts Southwestern on the
Map, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at BI.
20. Legendary defense attorney Cochran headed Simpson's defense team. Cochran Dead,supra
note 11. After Simpson was asked to try on a glove found at the crime scene, Cochran coined the
famous phrase, "If it doesn't fit, you must acquit." See id. Despite securing Simpson's acquittal on
the murder charge, Cochran was criticized for using race to obtain the verdict from a predominantly
African-American jury. See GElS & BIENEN, supra note 1, at 182.
21. A Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) detective, Fuhrman discovered the bloody gloves
that the prosecution used to link Simpson to the murders. See Bernard Ryan, Jr., O.J. Simpson
Trials: 1995 & 1996-97, in 2 GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS 1371, 1372 (Edward W. Knappman ed., 2d
ed., 2002). During his testimony at trial, he denied having used the word "nigger" in the previous
ten years. Id. at 1374. However, the defense later secured an audiotape that directly contradicted
Fuhrman's testimony. Id. at 1378. The tape contained an interview with screenwriter Laura
McKinney regarding a script she was writing. Id. at 1377-78. On the tape, Fuhrman used the word
"nigger" forty-one times and displayed prejudice toward African-Americans. See id. at 1378. The
defense argued that such comments made Fuhrman a racist who planted evidence in an attempt to
frame Simpson. See Analyisis [sic] of the O.J Simpson Murder Trial-The Crime library,
http://www.crimelibrary.com/notorious.murders/famous/simpson/siege_l 1.
CRIMELIBRARY.COM,
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
22. Jones, supra note 9. Kaelin lived in the guesthouse at Simpson's estate. Ryan, supra note
21, at 1372. His testimony regarding statements made by Simpson before the murders along with
information on Simpson's whereabouts the night of the crime made him a crucial prosecution
witness. See id. at 1374.
23. Renee Graham, Revisiting the O. circus, the media is guilty again, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8,
2004, http://www.boston.com/ae/media/articles/2004/06/08/revisiting-theoj-circus-the-media-is
guilty-again/. This statement serves as further evidence of the fascination with Simpson and his
murder trial that existed at the time.
24. Ryan, supra note 21, at 1380-81. Three separate civil suits were brought against Simpson:
one by Fred Goldman; one by Goldman's mother, Sharon Rufo; and a third by the Browns on behalf
of Nicole's estate. Id. at 1380. A wrongful death claim was filed by each of Goldman's parents for
the loss of support caused by the death of their son. Id. In contrast, the Brown family filed only a
survival action for the assault and battery that culminated in Nicole's death. Id. It is uncommon for
criminal defendants to be subject to a civil suit following an acquittal on criminal charges. See
Oct.
23,
1995,
John
Farley,
Simpson's Civil Wars, TIME.COM,
Christopher
However, in Simpson's case,
http://www.time.com/timc/magazinc/article/0,9171,983614,00.html.
the victims' families believed there were considerable assets worth pursuing. See id. The civil trial
differed from the murder trial in several important ways. First, the civil case carried a lower
standard of proof, requiring a "preponderance of the evidence" standard rather than proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. Second, a unanimous jury was not required. Id. Rather, only nine out of
twelve jurors were needed for a guilty verdict. Id. Third, Simpson was forced to testify in the civil
action, while in the criminal case his constitutional rights enabled him to avoid taking the stand. See
id. Fourth, the civil case was heard in a Santa Monica, California court in front of a mostly white
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found Simpson liable for the wrongful death of Ron Goldman, as well as

battery against Nicole Brown. 25 The jury verdict ordered Simpson to pay
damages totaling $33.5 million, including $8.5 million in compensatory

damages and $25 million in punitive damages.26
Nearly ten years later, the civil judgment remains virtually unpaid by
Simpson.2 7 In September 2006, Fred Goldman, the father of victim Ron
Goldman, filed a petition in a Los Angeles court asking for the assignment

and transfer of Simpson's right of publicity to partially satisfy the family's

portion of the judgment. 28 Of the $33.5 million awarded by the civil jury,

the Goldman's share was approximately $20 million, not including
interest. 29
Although publicity rights have been sold or transferred in the past, the
request for the court to forcibly take them as payment of a civil judgment

jury. See id. The criminal trial, in contrast, was held in downtown Los Angeles with a heavily
African-American jury. See 'Not Guilty': "Trial of the Century" Ends with Simpson's Acquittal,
CNN.cOM, Oct. 3, 1995, http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/daily/9510/l0-03/index.html. Finally, the civil
judge Hiroshi Fujisaki banned still photographers and placed a gag order on the lawyers and
witnesses to prevent them from discussing the proceedings with the media. Background Report: The
Simpson Case, CNN.COM, Feb. 4, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/O4/simpson.verdicts/#trial
(offering an overview of the civil case and the theories advanced by the plaintiffs and defense); see
also Gale Holland, Judge Fujisaki was Able to Keep Trial in Control, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 1997, at
5A, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/nns200.htm (discussing tactics used by Judge
Fujisaki to keep civil trial under control, including banning TV cameras from the courtroom).
25. Jennifer Auther, Charles Feldman & Greg LaMotte, Jury Unanimous: Simpson is Liable,
CNN.COM, Feb. 4, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/04/simpson.verdictl/index.html; see also
Ryan, supra note 21, at 1381 (detailing the Simpson civil proceedings).
26. See Jury Orders Simpson to Pay $25 million, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1997, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/nns2l6.htm [hereinafter Jury Orders].
27. See Goldmans Seek Control of O.J. Simpson's Right to Publicity, CNN.COM, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/05/oj.simpson/index.html [hereinafter Goldmans Seek Control]
(stating that Simpson has turned over only a small amount of money to the Goldman family, despite
the fact it is believed Simpson has made money from trade show appearances).
28. See Ron Goldman's Dad Asks for Rights to O.J. Simpson's Image to Pay Off Judgment,
FOXNEwS.COM, Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,212338,00.html [hereinafter
Simpson's Image] (discussing the filing of the suit by Fred Goldman). Simpson has avoided paying
the civil judgment because his National Football League pension and Florida home cannot be seized.
Id. In filing the suit for Simpson's right of publicity, Fred Goldman stated he wants to take "what
we perceive is probably the most important thing to him, and that's his ego, and that's the
opportunity to use his name and likeness to earn money." Id. The petition claims Simpson earns
funds through making public appearances and signing autographs and football jerseys. Id.
29. Id.; see also Jury Orders, supra note 26 (explaining the punitive damage award of $25
million was split between the Brown estate and Goldman family, with each receiving $12.5 million,
while the compensatory damages of $8.5 million went solely to the Goldman family). With interest,
O.J. Simpson Retains Rights to His Image,
the judgment is estimated at $38 million.
FOXNEWS.cOM, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,227197,00.html [hereinafter
Simpson Retains Rights].
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was a novel legal tactic by Goldman's attorney. 3 ° While the motion
subsequently was dismissed by a Santa Monica judge,31 the issue could
come up again, particularly in California, the center of the entertainment
industry. The question of whether post-judgment enforcement remedies
may include the transfer of publicity rights could, theoretically, be raised by
any plaintiff holding a judgment against a defendant perceived as having
lucrative publicity rights. 32 This Comment explores the legal complexities
surrounding this newest chapter in the Simpson storyline as well as the
implications of this lawsuit for other celebrities.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and background of the
right of publicity and how it differs from the right of privacy.3 3 It provides
an overview of the right of publicity's expansion through the years to cover
more individuals and more attributes of identity.34 As California law is
controlling in this case, Part III details the right of publicity within the
context of California state law.35 While California uses a combination of
common-law and statutory provisions to protect against the infringement of
publicity rights, the focus will be on the two statutes establishing causes of
action for both living and deceased persons.36
Part IV outlines the
arguments advanced by Fred Goldman and Simpson and evaluates them in
light of relevant case law and statutory provisions.3 7 This discussion is
followed by an analysis of the court's rationale in deciding to dismiss the
case. 38 Part V offers thoughts on the court's opinion and argues the result it

30. See Simpson 's Image, supra note 28.

3 1. The suit was dismissed by Santa Monica Superior Court Judge Linda Lefkowitz on October
31, 2006. Simpson Retains Rights, supra note 29. The dismissal generated praise from Simpson

attorney Yale Galanter: "There has never been a case in the U.S. where a judge has involuntarily
taken somebody's identity rights. If she did, the Goldmans would be able to speak on behalf of O.J.

Simpson. They'd be able to use his image without his approval." Id.
32.

See Patt Morrison, Patt Morrison: Owning O.J, LATIMES.COM, Sept. 7, 2006, available at

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-morrison7sep07,0,6067659.column?coll=
la-home-commentary. A Los Angeles Times commentary provides a somewhat humorous example
of a potential suit that could arise if Fred Goldman's petition were granted. Writer Part Morrison

explains:
Paris Hilton's small, tormented pet ... happens to take a bite out of you while you're
stuck alongside her behind the rope at the MTV Video Music Awards after-party. You
sue ....
You go to court for redress and suddenly you own Paris Hilton. Her name, her
image, her perfume profits, her CD royalties, such as they are-all yours, until the

million bucks she owes you for the coatimundi bite is paid off.
Id.
33. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2006), held preempted in partby federal Copyright Act
by Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1371 (2007); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2006).
37. See infra notes 122-82 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 183-23 and accompanying text.
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reached was the correct one under the current law. 3 9 Part VI speculates as to
the possible implications of suits seeking a celebrity's right of publicity,
including concerns of involuntary servitude. 40 Finally, Part VII concludes
the Comment by asserting that the assignment and transfer of publicity
rights, while not currently recognized in the debtor-creditor context, should
be available as a remedy for unpaid creditors.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Before discussing the suit to transfer Simpson's right of publicity, and
the arguments advanced by Goldman and Simpson, it is crucial to
understand the area of law upon which the parties' contentions will be based.
In recent years, fame has been seen increasingly as a commodity in the
United States rather than as a solely personal trait. 42 Encouraged by
celebrities and other public figures, states have crafted a new type of

intellectual property called the right of publicity that is recognized by
common law, statute, or both.4 3 This right permits those in the public eye,

and in some cases, their heirs, to control how their name and face is used and
to seek payment when their identity is exploited for commercial purposes.44

39. See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 232-77 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
42. Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the
Uncharted Boundariesof the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1322 (2002) (analyzing the
right of publicity as an asset in the debtor-creditor context, and specifically, how publicity rights
might be treated in a bankruptcy action).
43. See id. Currently, twenty-eight states recognize publicity rights for living persons, either by
common law or statute.

See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY

§ 6:3 (2d ed. 2006). Specifically, eighteen states recognize the right of publicity under the common
law, including Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin. Id. Of these states, eight also have statutes that supplement the common law: California,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. Additionally, ten states,
while not recognizing the right of publicity under the common law, have statutes dealing with the
right of publicity: Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Id. As this survey of the states demonstrates, the right of
publicity is widely recognized in some form in the majority of states. However, the laws are a
veritable patchwork, with each state choosing to protect publicity rights differently.
44. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (describing how Elvis
Presley's estate brought a right-of-publicity action against the producer of THE BIG EL SHOW, a
stage production showcasing an Elvis Presley impersonator and patterned after an Elvis Presley
stage show). The court in Estate of Presley defined the common-law right of publicity as "the right.
• • to control the commercial value and exploitation of [a person's] name and picture or likeness and
to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for their commercial benefit." Id. at 1353;

355

Although evolved from the right of privacy, the right of publicity is
distinguishable in the interests it protects. 45 Commonly claimed by private
persons, the right of privacy protects against injuries to the individual's
feelings, often precipitated by unwanted publicity. 46 The right of privacy is
based upon a personal right and "the correct measure of damages is the
extent of injury to the individual's feelings and not the value that the
defendant received from the unauthorized use of his name or picture. 4 7 In
contrast, the right of publicity is primarily reserved for celebrities who seek
out exposure and, thus, are not likely to be embarrassed by having their
name or image circulated.48 The right of publicity is a pecuniary interest

see also Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (where a
court for the first time explicitly recognized the fight of publicity as a right "in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy"). In expressing the need for publicity rights, the court stated:
[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using their pictures.
Id.
45. See Howard 1. Berkman, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities,42 BROOK. L. REv. 527, 527 (1976). In Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., one court offered
a helpful description of the differences between the rights of privacy and publicity:
On the one hand, where plaintiff is a person previously unknown to the general
public, that is, one who has lived a life of relative obscurity insofar as publicity is
concerned, the gist of his complaint is that, by reason of the publication of his picture in
connection with the advertisement of a product, he has been unwillingly exposed to the
glare of public scrutiny. In such a case, plaintiff's right of privacy has truly been
invaded.
On the other hand, where plaintiff is a person who may be termed a "public figure,"
such as an actor or an athlete, the gist of his complaint is entirely different. He does not
complain that by reason of the publication of his picture in connection with the
advertisement of a product, his name and face have become a matter of public comment,
but rather that the commercial value which has attached to his name because of the fact
that he is a public figure has been exploited without his having shared in the profits
therefrom.
Id. at 532-33 n.34 (quoting Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila.
County 1957) (where professional golfer Ben Hogan brought suit against A. S. Barnes Company for
publishing a book with plaintiffs picture on the cover as well as his name and picture inside the
book)).
46. See id. at 527, 533. The right of privacy is the "right to be let alone" and the injury is mental
because it involves feelings of humiliation and embarrassment. Id. Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis were the first to recognize the right to privacy. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
47. Berkman, supra note 45, at 533.
48. See id. at 529, 533. In contrast to the right of privacy, which protects against injuries to
feelings, the right of publicity recognizes public figures' desire for publicity. Id. As Berkman
writes, "[li]t is ludicrous to suggest that the vast majority of entertainers . . . experience
embarrassment or humiliation when their names or images are publicized. Rather, in most cases
publicity is desired inasmuch as a celebrity's income may be directly proportionate to the celebrity's
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founded on the denial of compensation for endorsements and the property

rights public figures have in their name and likeness. 49 Damages for an

invasion of the right of publicity seek to prevent unjust enrichment and
include the "value that the defendant received from the unauthorized use of

[the plaintiff's] name or picture."5 °
Once considered applicable only to celebrities and entertainers, publicity
rights have been extended in many jurisdictions to encompass any famous
person, including those whose fame is a secondary effect of their

degree of fame." Id. at 533. Although the private person usually seeks to shun publicity, a public
figure seeks attention. Id. at 527, 529. Celebrities who have brought right-of-publicity claims
include: Johnny Carson, Bette Midler, and Vanna White. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding the use of the phrase "Here's Johnny"
by a toilet rental company infringed on the late-night personality's right of publicity); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a violation of plaintiff's right of publicity in the
use of a Bette-Midler sound-alike in television commercials); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining there was a right-of-publicity claim that could go to a
jury where advertisements portrayed a robot resembling Vanna White).
49. See Berkman, supra note 45, at 533. There are several justifications for giving celebrities a
property right in their personas. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 178-79 (1993) (detailing the various rationales
behind publicity rights). First, the right of publicity allows individuals to reap the fruits of their
labors. I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 2:2. According to this rationale, celebrities are entitled to
control and profit from their images' publication because of the time and effort they have devoted to
cultivating fame and notoriety. Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an
Expanded Right of Publicityfor Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 12 (Spring 2001). Second,
the right of publicity provides needed incentives to foster creativity. See I MCCARTHY, supra note
43, § 2:6. By giving individuals the exclusive right to profit from the economic value they build in
their identity, the right of publicity will motivate people to invest further in improving their skills
and talents. See id. Such investment results in socially desirable behavior that ultimately leads to a
better society. See id. Third, the right of publicity promotes the flow of information regarding
goods and services and safeguards consumers from deception. See id. §§ 2:7-2:8. Through the right
of publicity, advertisers are held accountable for misleading the public through the use of a celebrity
image where the celebrity does not actually endorse the product or service. Carpenter, supra, at 13.
Moreover, allowing individuals to determine how and when their identities will be used
commercially maximizes the identities' economic value. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 2:7. If
anyone who wants to use an identity can do so freely, the value of the identity is diluted and its
economic value is lost. See id. Granting property rights results in efficient allocation of scare
resources and ensures the resource goes to the highest and best use. See id. Finally, the right of
publicity prevents unjust enrichment by publishers. Carpenter, supra, at 14. This argument rests on
the belief that it is wrong for "free riders" to profit from another person's work. Id. Allowing
publishers alone to profit from a celebrity's fame results in disincentives for famous individuals to
enter the public domain and relinquish their freedom and privacy. See id.
50. Berkman, supra note 45, at 533. A further indication of the worth of celebrities' publicity
rights is the compensatory awards they receive when a misappropriation of them is found. See
Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1332. The use of the Beatles' respective personas in the
show Beatlemania resulted in an award of almost $8 million to the Beatles. Id. at 1332 (citing Apple
Corps. Ltd v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1016 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986)). After Bette Midler's voice
was imitated in a Ford commercial, Midler received $400,000 in compensation. Id.

involvement in politics or public affairs. 5 Certain states, such as Florida,
have abandoned attempts to limit publicity rights to a selected group.5"
Instead, these states have held that every person has a potential property

interest in the exploitation of the person's identity for commercial
purposes. 53

In addition to the variation between states regarding the

51. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1336. Exploiting a celebrity's identity has become
big business. Tiger Woods, in addition to his winnings on the golf course, earned a reported S50-60
million in 2000 through the licensing of his name and face to companies such as Nike that use them
to sell products. Id. at 1330. See also David Grainger, Tiger Woods, CNNMONEY.COM,
Apr. 30, 2001, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2001/04/30/301939/
index.htm (stating that Woods earned $54 million from endorsements in 2000). The contract with
Nike was a five-year deal worth $100 million that ran through 2006, with the availability of option
years afterwards.
Chris Isidore, Tiger's Still a Winner for Sponsors, CNNMONEY.COM,
June 18, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/06/18/commentary/column-sportsbiz/sportsbiz/index.
htm. Woods has even established a corporation called ETW to manage his publicity rights. Jacoby
& Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1331 & n.61 (noting that the trademark "TIGER WOODS" was
registered by ETW Corp. "for art prints, calendars, mounted photographs, notebooks, pencils, pens,
posters, trading cards, and unmounted photographs" (quoting ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 829, 830 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff'd, 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003))). Another example is
Michael Jordan who, prior to his retirement from the NBA, earned $40 million in a one-year span by
allowing his name to be used in the promotion of sneakers, underwear, and telephone service. Id. at
1331. In 1984, PepsiCo paid $5.5 million to Michael Jackson to perform a popular song in a
television advertisement and allow the company to sponsor his "Victory Tour." Madow, supra note
49, at 129 n. 1 (citing Judann Dagnoli, Pepsi, Jackson Start "Relationship," ADVERTISING AGE,
May 12, 1986, at 6). Jackson later re-signed with PepsiCo, this time for three years and $15 million.
Id. (citing Richard Harrington, Pepsi & the Pop Star: Michael Jackson's $15 Million Cola Deal,
WASH. POST, May 6, 1986, at C2). In 1986, Dole Food Company paid country singer Kenny Rogers
$17 million to promote its products. Id. (citing Last Minute News, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 15,
1986, at 1, 8). Publicity rights also extend to politicians whose involvement in public affairs makes
them recognizable to the public. The first modern example of a politician endorsing a product arose
when William E. Miller, the vice-presidential candidate who ran with Barry Goldwater, appeared in
a television commercial for American Express. I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 4:2 n.4. Past vicepresidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro appeared in a Diet Pepsi television advertisement in 1985.
Id. at § 4:2. Former Speaker of the House, the late Tip O'Neill represented American Express,
Miller Lite beer, and Quality Inns.
See Business Notes: Advertising, Oct. 2, 1989,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,958660,00.html (discussing the $100,000 per
day O'Neill makes as a spokesperson). A more recent example is former Senator Robert Dole who
became the spokesperson for Viagra. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1336. Finally, in
2004, a dispute arose between Arnold Schwarzenegger and an Ohio company manufacturing and
selling "bobblehead" dolls of the movie actor and California Govemor. I MCCARTHY, supra note
43, § 4:23. The dolls depicted Schwarzenegger in a business suit and holding a gun with
ammunition swung across his chest. Id. After Schwarzenegger's licensing company sued the doll
maker for infringing his right of publicity, the parties settled and the company agreed to stop the sale
of the dolls. Id.
52. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1336. A Florida statute states that a right-ofpublicity action can be brought based upon the commercial use of "the name, portrait, photograph, or
other likeness of any natural person" without permission. See id. at 1336 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08 (West 2002)).
53. Id. at 1336. While some commentators have suggested only celebrities have publicity rights,
the modem view held by a majority of courts and scholars is that everyone possesses a right of
publicity. I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 4:14. As a result, the celebrity/non-celebrity designation
does not determine the existence of the right, but only the amount of recoverable damages. Id.
Melville B. Nimmer commented on this idea:
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individuals covered, the characteristics covered also differ. In every state
recognizing publicity rights, the use of both names54 and likenesses 55 is

It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have achieved the status of
celebrity and which have not; it should rather be held that every person has the property
right of publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim for infringement of the
right will turn upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in turn will depend in
great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the plaintiff. Thus, the right of
publicity accorded to each individual 'may have much or little, or only a nominal value,'
but the right should be available to everyone.
J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1703, 1710 (1987) (quoting Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 217
(1954)). Because the economic value of an everyday citizen's publicity rights would not be high, the
right normally is litigated only when the individual has achieved a certain level of fame. See I
MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 4:3. It is the identities with the greatest commercial value that are
most likely to be used in advertising and, thus, that are the most vulnerable to exploitation. Id.
54. The courts have often found liability based upon a personal name that clearly identifies an
individual. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case,
defendants alleged it could use the name "Lew Alcindor" in an Oldsmobile commercial because
plaintiff, a well-known NBA player, had changed his name to "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar" ten years
prior to the suit. See id. at 409-10. The Ninth Circuit held that abandonment of a name was not a
defense to a claim of infringement of publicity rights. See id. at 415. The court explained:
To the extent GMC's use of the plaintiffs birth name attracted television viewers'
attention, GMC gained a commercial advantage . . . . Whether or not Lew Alcindor
"equals" Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in the sense that "'Here's Johnny' equal[led] Johnny
Carson," or "'the greatest' equal[led] Muhammad Ali"-or the glamorously dressed
robot equalled Vanna White-is a question for the jury.
Id. at 415-16. Courts also have held that a defendant's use of variations of a name will not avoid
liability if the surrounding context makes the plaintiff recognizable to the reasonable person. See I
MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 4:52. In one case, actor Charles Amador was enjoined from appearing
as "Charlie Aplin" in a movie. Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). The film
showed Charlie Aplin imitating the mannerisms and appearance of Charlie Chaplin's famous "Little
Tramp" character. Id. at 545. The film's producer solicited theatre owners to show the film by
claiming it featured "Charlie Aplin in the well known character, famous the world over." Id. The
court determined that the total context, including the defendant's name, contributed to deceiving the
public. Id. at 546. Similarly, if a person "is known by a nickname, stage name, or pen name," the
use of such a name can identify the plaintiff and lead to liability. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 43,
§ 4:56. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that former football star Elroy Hirsch should be
granted a trial to show he was identified by the nickname "Crazylegs." See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 140 (Wis. 1979). Due to his unique running style, Hirsch received the
nickname following a college football game. See id. at 131. Both as a professional football player
and as a coach, Hirsch appeared in advertisements in which he was identified as "Crazylegs." Id. at
131-32. Defendant S.C. Johnson & Son used the name "Crazylegs" to advertise a shaving gel for
females. Id. at 130. The court examined whether the defendant had gained a commercial advantage
by using the name "Crazylegs" in its advertisements and held there was a triable issue of fact for a
jury. See id. at 137-38.
55. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding a photograph of plaintiff's legendary racing car in a cigarette advertisement infringed on
right of publicity); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting a preliminary
injunction on a right-of-publicity claim where defendant published a picture of a nude black man in a
boxing ring along with the caption "The Greatest" that undeniably referred to plaintiff).

protected.56

In some jurisdictions, tag lines, voices, and signatures are

covered as well,57 while in others, imitations of a public figure's voice58 or
appearance 5 9 might also fall within the right of publicity.6 °
Terming the right of publicity a property right allows for the possibility
that the right survives the death of the owner, and is thus alienable and
inheritable. 6' Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co. was the first case to
acknowledge the descent of publicity rights.62 In it, the producers of

"Dracula" films starring the late actor Bela Lugosi licensed manufacturers to
create games and shirts bearing Lugosi's likeness.63 Subsequently, Lugosi's

56. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1336-37.
57. Id. at 1337 & n.92 (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding one element of talk show host's publicity rights was the "Here's Johnny" tag
line)).
58. Id. at 1337 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)). A jury awarded
$2.6 million in compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees to singer Tom Waits
after Frito-Lay ran a Doritos chips advertisement using a sound-alike of the singer. Waits v. FritoLay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992). Frito-Lay created an advertising campaign using a
song inspired by Waits' classic tune Step Right Up. Id. at 1097. Waits had a widely-known policy
against doing commercials because he felt they detracted from a musician's artistic integrity. Id. In
searching for a lead singer, Frito-Lay felt it needed a person who "could not only capture the feeling
of 'Step Right Up' but also imitate Tom Waits' voice." Id. The person selected was Stephen Carter,
a fan of Waits who had made a career out of performing Waits' music. Id. Although an alternate
version of the commercial was created using a singer who did not sound like Waits, Frito-Lay
ultimately opted against using it. Id. at 1098. Waits subsequently filed a suit for infringement of the
common-law right of publicity and false endorsement under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1096. The
Ninth Circuit drew upon its holding in Midler to affirm the jury award finding a right-of-publicity
infringement. Id. at 1098-1100. The court explained, "We recognized in Midler that when voice is a
sufficient indicia of a celebrity's identity, the right of publicity protects against its imitation for
commercial purposes without the celebrity's consent." Id. at 1098. The court found that the
imitation of a distinctive voice fell within the scope of the right of publicity and therefore it deserved
protection. Id. at 1099-1100.
59. A case involving an imitation of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis provided yet another
opportunity for the courts to define the right of publicity's reach. In Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., a New York court determined that Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was identifiable from an
advertisement showing a photograph of a look-alike model. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
("Plaintiff's name appears nowhere in the advertisement. Nevertheless, the picture of a well-known
personality, used in an ad and instantly recognizable, will still serve as a badge of approval for that
commercial product."), aff'd without opinion, 110 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
60. In both Tennessee and New Jersey, the use of a look-alike performer who impersonates a
performance of a famous person has been held an infringement of publicity rights. Scott L.
Whiteleather, Still Dancing: An Article on Astaire v. Best Video and its Lasting Repercussions, 7
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 267, 275 (2000). In contrast, Nevada's statute exempts impersonators from
right-of-publicity claims. Id. This exclusion is no doubt due to the large number of shows occurring
each year in Las Vegas.
61. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 941-42 (10th
ed. 2000).
62. See David R. Ginsburg, Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula'sProgeny and
Privacy's Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1975) (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co.,
603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1972)).
63. Id. at 1113-14.
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64
widow and son brought an action for infringement of the right of publicity.

Examining past precedents such as Haelan Laboratories,the court held that
the right of publicity did not end with the death of Lugosi, and therefore,
recovery by Lugosi's beneficiaries by will was permitted.

Not all states recognize the inheritability of publicity rights,66 and even

among those that do, there are substantial differences in treatment.67 States

such as Indiana and Oklahoma allow the right of publicity to endure for 100
years after the deceased personality's death.68 In contrast, Tennessee
69
permits the interest to continue as long as the heirs are exploiting it.
Because states differ on the scope of the right of publicity and its

inheritability, the determination of which jurisdiction's laws control is a

64. Id.at 1115.
65. See id. at 1115-17. By contrast, privacy rights die with the individual because they are
considered personal in nature. Id.at 1116.
66. Two states, New York and Wisconsin, explicitly reject a common-law postmortem right of
publicity. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 9:31, 9:40 (2d ed.

2007). Neither New York nor Wisconsin has enacted statutes to overrule the court decisions. Id.
§ 9:19; see also Rhett H. Laurens, Note, Year of the Living Dead: CaliforniaBreathes New Life into
CelebrityPublicity Rights, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 109, 120 (2001). Ironically, New York
was the first state to acknowledge a right of publicity for living persons. Laurens, supra at 120.
New York is unique because there is no right-of-publicity statute and its courts do not recognize
publicity rights under common law. Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a
FederalRight of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227, 238 (1999). Rather, New
York relies on a right-of-privacy statute to protect the publicity rights of living persons. Id. at 23839. To have an actionable claim, a person must demonstrate that "(1) defendant used his name,
portrait or picture (2) for purposes of trade or advertising (3) without his written consent." Id.at
239. Several proposed bills have been introduced as part of efforts to establish a right-of-publicity
section in the New York Civil Code, but all have been unsuccessful. Id. at 238.
67. Fourteen states have legislation that specifically recognizes the publicity rights of deceased
personalities. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, § 9:18. Each state allows the postmortem rights to
extend for a different time period following the deceased personality's death. These states include
California (seventy years), Florida (forty years), Illinois (fifty years), Indiana (one hundred years),
Kentucky (fifty years), Nebraska (no duration given), Nevada (fifty years), Ohio (sixty years),
Oklahoma (one hundred years), Pennsylvania (thirty years), Tennessee (unlimited duration while
rights are exploited; otherwise ten years), Texas (fifty years), Virginia (twenty years), and
Washington (seventy-five years if identity has "commercial value," while ten years if it does not).
See id. §§ 9:20, 9:22, 9:24-:26, 9:28-:29, 9:32-:36, 9:38-:39. Additionally, five states have
recognized a postmortem right of publicity by common law. Id. § 9:18. These states include
Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, and Utah. See id. §§ 9:21, 9:23, 9:27, 9:30, 9:37.
68. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1337 & n.97 (citing IND. CODE ANN. 32-36-1-8
(West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 1448(G) (West 2002)).

69. Id.at 1337 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1104 (West 2002)). If there is no commercial
use of the right, the statute provides for an unqualified ten-year postmortem term. 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 66, § 9:35. In effect, the estate has ten years to determine whether or not to make
commercial use of the identity. Id. Following this period, the continued duration of the statutory
rights are conditioned on commercial use. Id.

crucial one. States employ different choice-of-law rules falling within three
broad categories: (1) the law of the forum; (2) the law of the place of
infringement; or (3) the law of the place of plaintiff's domicile.7 ° First,
applying the substantive law of the forum state presents the simplest rule for
the courts to follow. 7 1 However, a concern posed by this rule is the
possibility for a clever plaintiff to manipulate the law through forumshopping.72 In cases involving infringements in multiple states, defendants
would be left to question which state's law will be applied.73 Second, other

states apply the law of the place where the infringing act occurs.74 Because
there will frequently be at least some infringing act taking place in the forum
70. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, §§ 11:12-: 15.
71- See id. § 11:12; see also Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823
(9th Cir. 1974) (hold that law of forum state applied because "California, as the forum, has an
interest in convenience and presumably can most easily ascertain its own law.").
72. 2 MCCARTHY, supranote 66, § 11:12.
73. Id. The differences in state law have resulted in plaintiffs "shopping" for the state with the
most favorable law for their position. Goodman, supra note 66, at 244. This phenomenon has made
it increasingly difficult for attorneys to advise their clients on right-of-publicity issues because of the
inability to predict where the suit will be brought. Id. An attorney may explain to his client how a
California court will rule on the matter, only to have the suit filed in New York instead.
74. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, § 11:13; see also McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914
(3d Cir. 1994) ("We apply New Jersey law to the question of unauthorized commercial use because
the alleged unauthorized use occurred in New Jersey."). As another example, California law applies
when a nonresident sues in California for an infringement of publicity rights that is published or
distributed in the state. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, § 11:13. When addressing choice-of-law
questions, California employs a three-step governmental interest analysis:
First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected
jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different.
Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction's interest in the
application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine
whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it
carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each
jurisdiction in the application of its own law "to determine which state's interest would be
more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state" and then
ultimately applies "the law of the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its
law were not applied."
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976)). In Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, the Ninth
Circuit held that California law applied when residents of Hawaii sued in California for infringement
of the right of publicity arising from a catalog distributed in California. 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2001). The court proceeded through the three-step analysis detailed above. See id. at 1005-07.
While California had enacted a right-of-publicity statute, Hawaii lacked such a statutory right, and,
thus, there was a difference in the laws. See id. Despite this difference, there was no true conflict
present bccause Hawaii had no interest in having its law applied. See id. The court stated:
It is pure fancy to believe that Hawaii would wish to restrict its residents from recovery
that others could obtain in California solely because it had not exacted a statute like
California's to complement its common-law action for the same offense. Hawaii had no
interest in having its law applied to this action brought in California.
Id. at 1007. Because Hawaii did not have a legitimate interest in applying its law, the court never
reached the "comparative impairment" part of the test, and California law was applied to the claims.
Id.
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state, the two rules have the potential to overlap; thus, the same concerns

regarding forum-shopping are raised when infringement occurs in several
states. 75 Among those states where the defendant sells, a plaintiff could

select the state with the most favorable law.7 6 Third, most states abide by
the rule that the existence of postmortem publicity rights
are determined by
7
the law of the decedent's place of domicile at death.1
Indiana has enacted arguably the most aggressive right-of-publicity
statute in the United States. 8 Not falling within any of the previously
mentioned categories, the Indiana statute allows individuals to "enforce the
interest without regard to where the violation occurred or where the rights
holders are domiciled," provided the infringing publication was distributed

75. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, § 11: 13; see also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
76. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 66, § 11: 13.
77. Id. § 11:15. In looking at postmortem publicity rights, several cases show the important
impact choice-of-law rules can have on a court's decision. In Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and
Night Co., the heirs of the deceased Marx Brothers sued in New York federal court to prevent the
theatrical presentation of a New York play imitating the Marx Brothers' comedic style. 523 F. Supp.
485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). The estates
charged the defendants with misappropriating their publicity rights in the names and likenesses of
the Marx Brothers. Id. The district court found for the plaintiffs using New York law, which
recognized a descendible and assignable right of publicity. Id. at 489-91. Additionally, the Marx
Brothers had exploited their rights during their lifetimes, a requirement for the rights to pass to the
estate. 1d. at 492. The Second Circuit reversed the district court and applied California law.
Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). Using New York property
choice-of-law rules, the court held that California law applied to whether publicity rights formed a
part of the Marx Brothers' estate. Id. at 320-21. The court found especially significant that the
brothers were domiciled in California at their deaths. Id. at 320. Because California did not
recognize a postmortem right of publicity at that time, the court determined that the right of publicity
was not a part of the estate. 1d. at 323. Similarly, in ACME Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, the
court again used California choice-of-law principles to find that the right of publicity was a property
right existing at the place of the decedent's domicile. 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
Valerie B. Donovan, Unauthorized Use ofDeceased's Persona: Current Theories and the Need for
Uniform Legislative Treatment, in 2 PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: READINGS FROM COMMUNICATIONS

AND THE LAW 131-36 (Theodore R. Kupferman, ed., 1990) (discussing the Groucho Marx and
ACME Circus cases to show how choice-of-law decisions affect the descent of publicity rights). The
New York Court of Appeals drew on the Groucho Marx and ACME Circus decisions in a suit
involving the publicity rights of the late playwright Tennessee Williams. Se. Bank, N.A. v.
Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985). The question of descendability was decided based upon
Florida law where Williams was domiciled at his death. See id. at 745. The New York court chose
to adhere to the rule that whether such property is included in the decedent's estate is to be decided
by the law of the state of decedent's domicile at death. See id. Finally, a federal court in California
applied British law, which did not recognize publicity rights, to find that Princess Diana's estate had
no postmortem right of publicity that could be asserted against an infringer in California. See Cairns
v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-29 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Because California's choiceof-law rule considered the law of the decedent's domicile, and Princess Diana had died domiciled in
Great Britain, her estate had no claim for infringement in California. Id. at 1029.
78.

IND. CODE ANN. 32-36-1-1 to -20 (West 2002).
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or displayed in Indiana.7 9 This legislation seemingly extends to infringers
for activities occurring outside of the state. 8 ° CMG Worldwide, a leading
celebrity agency with offices in Indiana, pushed the statute's passage as part

of efforts to ensure maximum protection for its famous clientele. 8
The wide disparities among the states in the recognition and treatment of

publicity rights have led reformers to call for federal legislation to provide
uniformity throughout the country.82 Those in favor of a federal statute
point to the inconsistencies and confusion evident in state court decisions
addressing publicity rights. 83

If the various common-law and statutory

approaches are permitted to continue, individuals'

rights will not be

protected on a consistent basis as the law is manipulated through choice-of-

law rules.84 Despite this veritable patchwork of laws, this Comment's
principal concern is with the law of California, the state where Goldman
filed his suit seeking Simpson's publicity rights. It is to California's rightof-publicity framework that we now turn our attention.
III.

CALIFORNIA AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Because California law controls in the suit between Goldman and
Simpson,8 5 the state's right-of-publicity protections need to be examined in
order to understand the present litigation.
A.

Section 3344

Following the California courts' recognition of the common-law right of
publicity,8 6 the legislature supplemented the common law by creating a

79. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1335-36 (citing IND. CODE. ANN. 32-36-1-9 (West
2002)).
80. See id.
81. Goodman, supra note 66, at 239.
82. Donovan, supra note 77, at 142-47 (commenting on the need for Congress to enact federal
right-of-publicity legislation to unify the disparate state laws). Particularly when dealing with
choice-of-law questions, federal legislation would prevent the courts from having to reanalyze the
law to determine the rights involved. Id. at 147. Also, a federal statute would reduce the number of
appeals caused by the application of incorrect law. Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 66, at 265-77
(proposing model language for a federal right-of-publicity statute).
83. Donovan, supra note 77, at 146.
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
86. The California Supreme Court decision in Lugosi implicitly recognized a California
common-law right of publicity for living persons. Lugosi v, Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal.
1979), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (Deering 1990), renumbered by CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2006), amended by 1999 Cal. Legis. Serve. 5960, and 1999 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 5968 (West). Then, in the 1983 Eastwood case, the California Court of Appeal accepted the
label "right of publicity" as referring to a common-law right to protect the proprietary value of one's
identity against commercial uses. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 420 (Ct. App.
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statutory cause of action.8 7

Section 3344 of the California Civil Code

forbids "[a]ny person" without consent from knowingly using "another's

1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2006), in turn held
preempted in part by federal Copyright Act in Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145-46
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). The common-law cause of action has four
elements: "(1) defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs name or
likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting
injury." Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001)).
87. See § 3344. Section 3344 was originally passed in 1971 and later amended in 1985. The
statute defines the cause of action in the following manner:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent
of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof.
§ 3344(a). There-are limits to the right of publicity and publicity rights are often in tension with the
Copyright Act. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress a series of enumerated powers, including the
power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. As an exercise of this constitutional power, Congress passed the Copyright Act in 1976 to
protect copyright holders' rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000). Under the Act, a copyright owner
is given the "exclusive rights to do and to authorize" others to reproduce, distribute, perform, or
display copies of particular works as well as to prepare derivative works. § 106. In addition, section
301(a) of the Copyright Act evidences the intent of Congress "'to preempt and abolish any rights
under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to
works, within the scope of the Federal copyright law."' Laws, 448 F.3d at 1137. The Copyright Act
has been found to preempt right-of-publicity claims when a two-prong test is satisfied: (1) the
subject of the claim must be a work fixed in a tangible medium of expression and be subject to
copyright protection, and (2) the right asserted under state law must be equivalent to the exclusive
rights contained in the Copyright Act. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1003. While the majority of cases have
held there was no federal preemption, the Ninth Circuit in Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment found
such preemption. 448 F.3d at 1136. The case involved a 1980 recording of Very Special made by
singer Debra Laws. Id. Over twenty years later, Elektra, the record company that had released the
song, licensed a sampling of the recording for a new Jennifer Lopez tune called All I Have. Id.
Significantly for purposes of the current article, Laws asserted two causes of action, both under
California law: a right-of-privacy action under California's common law and a statutory right-ofpublicity claim under section 3344 of the California Civil Code. Id. at 1138. The lower court
granted summary judgment for Sony because it held that Laws' right-of-publicity claim was
preempted by the Copyright Act as it was based on the use of a sound recording that fell within the
federal copyright law's scope. Id. at 1136. The Ninth Circuit affirmed because it found the twopronged test for preemption was satisfied. Id. at 1139, 1143. Not only did the subject matter of
Laws' claim fall within the Copyright Act's subject matter, but also the state rights claimed were
equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act. See id. While this ruling resulted in the partial
abrogation of section 3344, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that its holding should not be interpreted to
mean the Copyright Act preempted every right of publicity claim. See id. at 1145. The Court stated,
"Our holding does not extinguish common law or statutory rights of privacy, publicity, and trade
secrets . . . so long as those causes of action do not concern the subject matter of copyright and
contain qualitatively different elements than those contained in a copyright infringement suit." Id.

name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services. ' 88 This
provision protects only the identity of natural persons.89 Corporations and

partnerships are not included because they are considered fictitious persons
under the law. 90 Upon its passage in 1971, the statute covered
only three
92
9
aspects of identity and persona: name, photograph, ' and likeness.

However, protections for voice and signature later were added in 1985. 9'
Several aspects of section 3344 are worth highlighting here. The
language "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" and "selling . . . of'
goods and services was added to clarify that the statute covers not only the

use of personal identity in advertising, but also any use on the goods
themselves. 94 Additionally, the use must be made "knowingly," as mistake
or inadvertence will serve as a complete defense to an infringement suit. 95
Not only must the use be a knowing one, but also a direct connection must
exist between the use of the attribute and the commercial purpose. 96

The

statute's silence on the issue of assignment and transferability implies that
consent to use must be obtained directly from the person. 9'

88. § 3344(a).
89. Id.
90. Legislative history suggests a corporation is not covered by the term "person" as used in
section 3344. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:28 n.I.
91. See § 3344. A "photograph" is defined as "any... photograph or photographic reproduction,
still or moving, or any videotape or live television transmission, of any person, such that the person
is readily identifiable." § 3344(b). A person is "readily identifiable" in a photograph "when one
who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted in
the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use." § 3344(b)(1).
92. § 3344; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a robotic caricature or resemblance did not constitute a "likeness" under section 3344(a) that
infringed White's statutory right of publicity, although a triable issue of fact was created in regard to
the common-law right of publicity). In contrast to section 3344, the scope of which is restricted to
the appropriation of "name ... or likeness," the California common law covers appropriation of any
indicia that identifies the plaintiff. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:29. If an individual, such as
White, is unable to qualify for California's statutory right-of-publicity protection, she may still
recover under the state's more expansive common-law right. Id.
93. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6.29. Because the statute only covers the use of the
plaintiff's "voice," no liability is incurred by use of a sound-alike or imitation voice. Id. However,
an infringement claim can still be brought under the common law. Id.
94. See id. § 6:31; see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) (holding that the use of a celebrity image on art reproductions and t-shirts without consent is
prohibited by section 3344).
95. § 3344(a).
96. See § 3344(e). A use is not considered actionable solely because it appears in material that is
"commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising." Id. Instead, a factual issue is raised as to
whether the use of the person's identity is "so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or
with the paid advertising" as to violate the statute. Id.
97. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:36.
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Furthermore, exemption from liability for certain uses of one's identity
is provided under the statute. 98

Appropriation of one of the delineated

aspects of identity in connection with any news, public affairs, sports
broadcast, or political campaign does not require consent because such uses
are protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.99
Finally, the statutory remedies include the greater of $750 or "actual
damages suffered . . . as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits
from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken
into account in computing the actual damages." 00 Besides actual damages,
a prevailing party also may be awarded punitive damages, legal costs, and
attorney's fees.' 0 ' While section 3344 does not explicitly provide for
injunctions preventing further infringements, the court possesses the inherent
power to grant them. 10 2 To supplement the protection given to living
persons under section 3344, the California legislature passed section 990
which provides the heirs of deceased personalities
with a cause of action
03

against right-of-publicity infringements. 1
B. Section 990

Enacted in 1985, California Civil Code section 990 established a fully

1°4
descendible property right in a deceased personality's right of publicity.

98. § 3344(d).
99. Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 66, at 237 (describing the exemptions available under the
statute). Determining the difference between what is considered "news" and "public affairs" has
been a topic of discussion for the courts. In Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 546
(Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals held that a documentary detailing the early days of surfing at
Malibu Beach fell within the "public affairs" exemption. The court remarked on the significant
effect of the surfing culture on dress, speech, behavior, and entertainment. Id. at 546. Because the
statute mentioned both "news" and "public affairs," there must be a certain category of "public
affairs" that is not considered "news." Id. at 545. The court assumed "public affairs" was "intended
to mean something less important than news," and pointed out that "[p]ublic affairs must be related
to real-life occurrences." Id.
100. § 3344(a).
101. Id.
102. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:45.
103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990, amended and renumbered by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering
1999).
104. Id. Deceased personality is defined as follows:
"[D]eceased personality" means any natural person whose name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death, whether or
not during the lifetime of that natural person the person used his or her name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or solicitation of purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods, or service.
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The statute protected a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,

photograph, and likeness for fifty years against the same types of
appropriations described in section 3344.105 However, in order to bring an
infringement suit, the use of the deceased personality's attributes need not be
made "knowingly," an important distinction from section 3344 and the

living celebrity's right of publicity. 10 6 Section 990 also required the
deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness to
have commercial value at the time of death, regardless of whether
these
07
attributes had been used during the deceased personality's life. 1

Due to the difficulty of tracking the ownership of postmortem publicity
rights, the statute established a registration system under which a person
claiming to be a "successor-in-interest" to, or a "licensee" of, these rights
could record a claim with the California Secretary of State.' 0 8 Although the
process was voluntary, the legislature encouraged registration of claims by

providing that no damages could be recovered for right-of-publicity
infringements occurring prior to claim registration.' 0 9 The recoverable
damages were the same as those given under section 3344,'1° although the

exemptions from liability were more extensive in scope."'

§ 990(h).
105. § 990(a), (g). "Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without
prior consent ... shall be liable." § 990(a). The protection granted lasted for fifty years following
the deceased personality's death. § 990(g).
106. § 990(a).
107. § 990(h); see Whiteleather, supra note 60, at 277 (discussing the provisions of section 990
before comparing them with newly enacted section 3344. 1).
108. § 990(f). "The claim includes the name and date of death of the deceased personality, the
name and address of the claimant, and a description of the basis and scope of the rights claimed." I
MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:40. The Secretary of State preserves a record of the claim for a
minimum of seventy years beginning at the death of the personality. Id.
109. § 990(f)(1).
110. § 990; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2006), held preempted in part by federal Copyright
Act by Laws v. Sony Music Entme't, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1371 (2007).
11I. § 990(n). The statute was not applicable to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in the following situations: (1) A play, book, magazine,
newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program; (2) Material of political or
newsworthy value; (3) Single and original works of fine art; (4) An advertisement or commercial
announcement for a use allowed by (1), (2), or (3). § 990(h). Critics of the statute believed it
exempted too many uses and, thus, granted only a small area of protection to deceased celebrity
personas. See Whiteleather, supra note 60, at 278. However, supporters argued that section 990's
protection was intended to be limited in scope and the exemptions defined the parameters of that
protection. Id. Despite this difference, sections 990 and 3344 have an exemption in common.
Similar to section 3344(d), section 9900) does not require consent to use a person's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with a news, public affairs, or sports broadcast, or a
political campaign. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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C. Section 3344.1
In the fall of 1999, a package of amendments was signed into law
dealing with California's postmortem right of publicity. 112 Known as the
"Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act," 11 3 the amendment made key
modifications to California Civil Code section 990, including renumbering
the provision to section 3344.1.114 First, the period of protection was
extended from fifty years to seventy years to coincide with a similar
extension given to copyright holders." 5 Second, the exemptions of section
990(n) were repealed and new exemptions added.' 16 Third, the revised
statute enabled a plaintiff to bring a suit when an unauthorized use occurred
in California, instead of basing standing on the decedent's domicile at
death. 117 Fourth, the amendment required the Secretary of State to list
successors-in-interest on the Internet. 18

112. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2006).
113. § 3344.1(o). The act received its name because Fred Astaire's widow, Robyn, was a driving
force behind the amendments. I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:34. She hoped to improve the
statutory scheme that resulted in a 1997 court loss. Id. In that suit, the court held the inclusion of a
ninety-second film clip of Fred Astaire dancing at the beginning of a Fred Astaire Dance Studio
instruction video was immune from liability under the exemption found in section 990(n)(4).
Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended, 136 F.3d
1208 (9th Cir. 1998).
114. § 3344.1.
115. § 3344.1(g); see Whiteleather, supra note 60, at 286.
116. In his treatise, McCarthy explains the revised exemptions found in 3344.1(a)(2):
[T]he unpermitted use of the protected identity of a deceased person is exempt from
statutory liability if: (1) it appears in a play, book, magazine, musical composition,
audiovisual work, radio or television program, single and original work of art, work of
political or newsworthy value; and (2) it is a fictional or nonfictional entertainment, or a
dramatic, literary, or musical work; or (3) it is an advertisement or commercial
announcement for any work that qualifies in the above two categories.
I MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 6:35 (citations omitted). Although a use fits into one of the above
categories, the use may still not be exempt if the plaintiff proves a direct connection between the use
and goods or services amounting to solicitation or advertisement of those goods or services by the
deceased personality. § 3344.1(a)(3). One section 990 exemption kept intact does not impose
liability for use of a protected identity in news, public affairs, sports broadcast, or political
campaign. § 3344.10). This exemption also applies to living celebrities under section 3344. See
supranote 99 and accompanying text.
117. § 3344.1(n). Under section 990, the deceased personality had to be domiciled in California at
death in order for a suit to be brought. See Whiteleather, supra note 60, at 286-87. The concern was
that a television commercial could be produced without liability if it was shown in California and
featured a celebrity who died domiciled in Georgia. Id. Regardless of the celebrity's domicile, the
celebrity would be damaged by this unauthorized use. Id. Section 3344.1(n) closes this potential
loophole and allows persons damaged in California to find redress there. Id.
118. § 3344.1(f)(3). It was hoped that posting on the Internet the names and addresses of those
people claiming rights in the deceased personality's persona would prevent unauthorized users from

Section 990(b) (now 3344.1(b)) treats the deceased person's statutory
rights as property "freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by
means of trust or testamentary documents." '

9

The statutory rights can be

transferred before death either by the deceased personality or by a transferee
to a subsequent purchaser. 20 Alternatively, the statutory rights may be
transferred after death by12those individuals to whom the rights pass or by a
transferee to a purchaser.
Having considered California's statutory scheme for the right of
publicity, we are now prepared to apply this law to the arguments advanced

by Goldman and Simpson.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE LAWSUIT: GOLDMAN V. SIMPSON

After a civil jury found Simpson liable in the 1997 wrongful death
action, Goldman undertook a range of post-enforcement remedies seeking to
satisfy the civil judgment. 12 2 However, these remedies proved unsuccessful

arguing they were unable to determine who owned the rights. See Whiteleather, supra note 60, at
286.
119. § 3344.1(b); see Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1025 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
("The postmortem publicity rights recognized in § 990 are property rights."), affid sub nom. Diana
Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., No. 98-56722, 1999 WL 1278044 (9th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1999).
120. § 3344.l(b); see also I MCCARTHY, supranote 43, § 6:36.
121. § 3344.1(b); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 43, § 6:36.
122. While Simpson sold his Heisman trophy and selected furnishings from his home in Los
Angeles, he had paid only several hundred thousand dollars of the judgment as of 2001. California
Supreme Court Rejects O.J. Simpson Damages Appeal, FOXNEwS.COM, Apr. 25, 2001,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,16415,00.html. In another small step towards collecting the
judgment, a memorabilia collector was forced to relinquish Simpson's press credentials from the
1984 Olympics.
Goldman Family Pursues Simpson Memorabilia to Cover Jury Award,
COURTTV.cOM, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.courttv.com/trials/ojsimpson/112404-juryawardap.html. More recent legal maneuvers by Fred Goldman have met with mixed success. In January
2007, Goldman filed a suit in federal court over the alleged $895,000 advance Simpson was paid for
the book and television deal cancelled in late 2006. Judge Refuses to Hear Suit Over O.J. Book
Money, MSNBC.coM, Jan. 24, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16795094/.
Simpson has
claimed he spent the advance on mortgage and tax payments, as well as tuition for his children's
schooling. Id. A federal judge refused to hear the lawsuit, citing a lack of jurisdiction and stating
the suit should be filed in a Florida court. Id. However, a California state court judge later issued a
restraining order preventing Simpson from spending money earned from past movie and book deals,
as well as the latest IfI Did It book. 0.. Simpson Ordered to Stop Spending, CNN.COM, Feb. 8,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/02/08/simpson.lawsuit.ap/index.html.
The judge deferred
any ruling on whether the Goldman family could collect any of the book advance. Goldmans Get
O.J Simpson's Royalties, Judge Says, CNN.COM, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/
LAW/02/20/oj.simpson.ap/index.html [hereinafter Goldmans Get Royalties]. Goldman met with
more success in a suit seeking royalty payments from Simpson's past movies, commercials, and
television shows. Id. While a California state court judge ordered that the payments be directed to
the Goldman family, an attempt to secure Simpson's future earnings was rejected. Id. The amount
of these royalty payments is unknown at present, and both sides have claimed victory. Id.
Simpson's attorney Yale Galanter contends the royalties Simpson earns from previous work in films
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in securing the estimated $38 million judgment, owing in 2part
to California
3
and Florida statutes exempting certain assets from seizure. 1

By filing the motion asking for the assignment and transfer of
Simpson's publicity rights, Goldman sought a court order "directing
[Simpson] to simply sign over a document conveying the right, title, and
interest in his right of publicity over to [Goldman] so that [Goldman] may
commercially exploit it as he sees fit."

124

The arguments advanced by both

Goldman and Simpson concern issues of personal jurisdiction, California
judgment law, and the scope of the right of publicity.

like "Naked Gun" are nominal. Id. He claims, "Last year Simpson's royalty checks from all of his
movies were less than 39 cents." Id. However, Goldman sees the ruling as moving a step closer to
securing the judgment. Id.
123. Court Ruling on Submitted Matter at 1, Goldman. v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (L.A. Super.
Ct., Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Court Ruling]. Once there was a valid judgment in California, the
U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause requires other states to honor the California
judgment. Found in Article IV of the Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit Clause reads, "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The
Clause promotes the unity of the states and provides for enforcement of civil claims and court
rulings across state lines. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1948) ("The full faith and
credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose
of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation."). Without its
enactment, the portability of court orders, nationwide recognition of legal status, out-of-state
taxation, spousal and child support, and the collections of fees would be impossible without separate
action. Despite the Full Faith and Credit Clause, certain exemptions in both California and Florida
prevent the Goldmans from collecting on their judgment. Simpson's NFL pension, $25,000 per
month, is exempt from a civil judgment in California, although the court can seize any money
Simpson earns. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.115 (Deering 2006) (exempting private retirement
plans from enforcement of money judgments); see also Goldman Won't Go After Simpson 's
Pension, CNN.COM, Aug. 28, 1997, http://edition.cnn.com/US/9708/28/simpson.pension/ (reporting
on the Goldman family decision not to seek Simpson's pension because of the exemption under
California law). Florida law prevents the Goldmans from seizing Simpson's home there. See FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4. The Florida homestead exemption is extremely broad in scope, offering nearly
total protection from the forced sale of property to meet creditor's demands. See id. Under the
exemption, there is no limit to the value of property that can be shielded from creditors, provided the
property occupies no more than a half-acre if located within a municipality, or 160 acres if situated
outside a municipality. Id. at (a)(l). The homestead exemption applies when a primary residence is
set up in Florida. Id.
124. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 1.

A.

Fred Goldman's Arguments

1. A California Court Possesses Personal Jurisdiction over Simpson.
Goldman contends California courts have personal jurisdiction over
Simpson for three reasons. First, under established California law, the court

that enters a judgment against a defendant retains jurisdiction throughout the
judgment's enforcement. 2 5 Second, Simpson has maintained contacts with
126
the state through appearances designed to exploit his publicity rights.
Third, Simpson has waived any jurisdictional objections by filing opposition
27
papers and a motion to dismiss, thus making a general appearance.1

125. Plaintiff's Consolidated Reply and Opposition in Support of Motion at 3:20-25, Goldman v.
Simpson, No. SC036340 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Consol. Reply]; see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.50(b) (Deering 2006) (providing once jurisdiction attaches in an
action, jurisdiction over both the parties and subject matter continues throughout latter proceedings).
While there is an absence of case law discussing this statute, Goldman's point is well-taken. A valid
judgment was entered in 1997 when the civil jury found Simpson liable in the wrongful death action.
Once the California courts exercised jurisdiction in that action, they maintain jurisdiction throughout
later proceedings. Other states are required to give full faith and credit to the California judgment.
See infra text accompanying note 123.
126. Plaintiff's Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 4:3-7. A California court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a party, provided it is consistent with the federal and state constitutions. See CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 2006). In the landmark case of International Shoe v.
Washington, the Supreme Court held:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he must have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). California has applied the "minimum contacts" analysis by adopting a
structure that divides jurisdiction into two types: general and specific jurisdiction. See Cornelison v.
Chancy, 545 P.2d 264 (Cal. 1976). General jurisdiction pertains to cases where a defendant has
extensive and continuous contact with California. Id. at 266. In such cases, the defendant is subject
to the California court's jurisdiction even if the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's instate activities. Id. Alternatively, specific jurisdiction encompasses cases where the activities of the
defendant in California are less wide-ranging. Id. For this reason, the court may exercise
jurisdiction only if there is a connection between the cause of action and the defendant's activities in
the state. Id. In the present litigation, Simpson continues to come to California in order to sign
autographs and make public appearances that capitalize on his right of publicity. See Andrew
Blankstein, O.J. Stars at HorrorConfab, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at B 1. Such activities constitute
"minimum contacts" with California sufficient for its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Simpson. In fact, Simpson's persona is arguably national in scope and reaches all parts of the
United States. Even if not considered pervasive enough for general jurisdiction, Simpson's
appearances are related to his right of publicity, which is the cause of action in the present suit
brought by Goldman. Therefore, specific jurisdiction still would exist.
127. Plaintiff's Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 4:9-5:7 (citing Roberts v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. App. 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1916) (holding that the filing of a responsive pleading is considered an
acceptance of personal jurisdiction). The Roberts court emphasized, "[i]t is the character of the
relief asked, and not the intention of the party that it shall or shall not constitute a general
appearance, which is material." Roberts, 30 Cal. App. at 720. If the defendant's only participation
in the suit is objecting to lack of personal jurisdiction, there is no general appearance. See Cal.
Dental Ass'n v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d 401, 404 (Cal. 1979). However, a person who raises
any issue other than jurisdiction will be considered to have made a general appearance and forfeited
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2.

The Right of Publicity Is a Transferable Property Right.

In addition to the jurisdictional claims, Goldman maintains that courts
have considered the right of publicity as a property right that is both
assignable and transferable. 2 8 California has used both statutes and case
law to attach property traits to the right of publicity. 2 9
Under California law, all property of the judgment debtor is subject to
enforcement of a money judgment, including intangible property such as
copyrights and patents.130 As a form of property, publicity rights also are

all objections to personal jurisdiction, service, or process. See id. Seeking any affirmative relief on
the merits will result in a general appearance. See In re Marriage of Torres, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1367,
1381 (Ct. App. 1998). There is much case law detailing what is considered a general or special
appearance. Compare Slaybaugh v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 216, 222-23 (Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that submission of an affidavit was not a general appearance), and Berard Constr. Co. v.
Mun. Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715 (Ct. App. 1975) (determining that a motion for attorney's fees
was not a general appearance), with Brown v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 333 P.2d 59, 62-63 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1958) (finding that motion to set aside a judgment of dismissal constituted a general
appearance), and Mansour v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1750, 1757-58 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a general appearance was made when attorneys conducted discovery unrelated to
jurisdiction, aided in preparing a case management statement, and participated in evaluation
hearing). Goldman's argument for jurisdiction is a strong one. Simpson not only objected to the
court's exercise of jurisdiction, but also filed an opposition to Goldman's motion to transfer and
assign Simpson's right of publicity. See Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Transferring and
Assigning Right of Publicity of Defendant and Judgment Debtor Orenthal James Simpson, Goldman
v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Opposition of Defendant].
This action recognized the authority of the court to proceed and asked for relief that could only be
granted if the court had jurisdiction over Simpson. As a result, Simpson made a general, rather than
a special appearance.
128. Motion for Transfer and Assignment of Right of Publicity at 4:14-20, Goldman v. Simpson,
No. SC036340 (L.A. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Motion for Assignment]. Goldman draws
on two cases for support. In Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1953), the court recognized the right of publicity for the first time as distinct from the
right of privacy. Motion for Assignment, supra, at 4:16-20. Also, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet
Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2002), the court held that a magazine
publisher, which had been assigned publicity rights by celebrities, had a strong likelihood of success
on its unfair competition claims. Motion for Assignment, supra, at 4:20-22.
129. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 4:10-11; 4:23-24; see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344
(Deering 2006), held preempted in part by federal Copyright Act by Laws v. Sony Music Entm't,
448 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344.1 (Deering 2006) (creating two causes of action for infringements of publicity rights, and
specifying that the owner of publicity rights may consent to use of a person's name and likeness for
commercial purposes); see also supra notes 85-121 and accompanying text (discussing California's
right of publicity).
130. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 5:1-6; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.010(a)
(Deering 2006) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, all property of the judgment debtor is subject
to enforcement of a money judgment."). According to Goldman, the critical question is whether
there is anything provided by law that prohibits the right of publicity from transfer in satisfaction of
the judgment. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion at 14:6-9, Goldman v. Simpson,

When
subject to enforcement to comply with a money judgment.'
property is intangible or cannot be executed upon, the court's equitable
in the
authority may be invoked to require the debtor's rights or interests
32
property to be transferred or assigned to the judgment creditor. 1
In Pacific Bank v. Robinson, the California Supreme Court held that a

judgment debtor owning a patent was required to assign all his rights in the
patent to a receiver for purposes of paying a judgment. 133 Finding no
difference between tangible and intangible property, the court determined

the policy behind the law was to subject all forms of property of a judgment
debtor to satisfy his debts. 134 Goldman compares the right of publicity to
patent rights and finds the court's rationale in Pacific Bank controlling. 131

No. SC036340 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief]. Without
such a prohibition, the entirety of Simpson's property is subject to enforcement under the statute. Id.
at 14:9-10. While California's judgment enforcement scheme fails to allow for the transfer and
assignment of publicity rights, it does not prohibit such actions either. Id. at 14:11-14. As Goldman
views the statute, it reaches all property of a judgment debtor, including intangible property. Id. at
14:14-16. Despite the general rule of section 695.010, the introductory clause acknowledges that by
law, some of the judgment debtor's property is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.010 (Law Revision Commission Comment). Included in this category
is property exempt by statute, such as Simpson's NFL pension. See supra note 123. Unfortunately,
the legislative history and case law on the statute does not address whether publicity rights are
covered within its broad provisions. As a result, the all-inclusive language "all property" would
appear to be open to Goldman's interpretation.
131. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 8:9-18.
132. Id. at 5:2-6; see Pac. Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520, 524 (1881); see also Peterson v. Sheriff
of City and County of S.F., 46 P. 1060, 1060 (Cal. 1896) ("[Tlhe government has provided that [a
patent] may be transferred by assignment, and that is the only method by which it can be transferred.
And if a creditor of the patentee can have the patent right subjected to the satisfaction of his
judgment at all, it can be done only by a court of equity acting in personam, and compelling the
patentee to make an assignment.").
133. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 6:5-8 (quoting Pac.Bank, 57 Cal. at 524) ("Patent
rights being, therefore, assignable by the voluntary act of the owner, and by act and operation of law,
it followed that a court of equity could compel the defendant to assign them to a receiver, to be sold
and applied to the satisfaction of judgments against him.")). A receiver is an officer of the court
selected to supervise property and is not an agent of either party. Lewis v. Hankins, 214 Cal. App.
3d 195, 200 (Ct. App. 1989). Appointing a receiver is considered a last resort because of the
expense involved. See Olsan v. Comora, 73 Cal. App. 3d 642 (Ct. App. 1977) (describing
appointment of a receiver to collect earnings and payments received by defendant's dental practice
until the rest of the judgment was satisfied).
134. Pac. Bank, 57 Cal. at 522. The court explained:
By the law of this State all goods, chattels, money, and other property, both real and
personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, are liable to execution. And if
there be property which cannot be reached by execution, and which the judgment debtor
refuses to apply to the satisfaction of the judgment, he may be compelled, upon
examination, in proceedings supplementary to execution, to deliver it in satisfaction of
the judgment; i.e., to a receiver appointed to dispose of it in aid of the execution. The
principle as well as the policy of the law is, therefore, to subject every species of property
of a judgment debtor to the payment of his debts. No species of property would seem to
be exempt, except such as is especially exempted by law, and any property not directly
liable to execution may be reached for the satisfaction of the judgments.
Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 5:11-18 (quoting Pac. Bank, 57 Cal. at 522) (citations
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Additionally, Goldman finds support for his position in statutory
provisions. In 1982, California Code of Civil Procedure section 708.510
was passed as part of a revised statutory scheme designed to address defects
in the area of post-judgment enforcement.'36 This section authorizes the
court to
order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor or to a
receiver.., all or part of a right to payment due or to become due,
whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments,
including but not limited to the following types of payments ... (2)
Rents[;] (3) Commissions[;]
[and] (5) Payments due from a patent
137
or copyright.
Goldman contends this section can be utilized to reach assets not subject
to execution as well as future income or rights to payment. 138 He argues the
right to payment can be equated to publicity rights that grant the right to
payment for use of an individual's persona. 139 Therefore, section 708.510 is
illustrative of the court's power to order broad assignments of property to
satisfy debts, including assignments of intangible property. 140
These
statutory powers extend the court's equitable powers, and demonstrate the
legislature's support of efforts to "subject all property of a judgment debtor
to satisfaction of a judgment."41
The proper method for executing on intangible property rights such as
patents is to secure a court order instructing the patent holder to assign the
patent. 42
The assignment need not be executed by the patentee
personally. 143 Instead, the court may authorize a court officer to effect the
assignment, which will be binding on the patentee. " Similarly, Goldman
asks the court either to direct Simpson to assign his right of publicity
outright or to permit a court official to carry out the assignment. 145

omitted).
135.

Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 5:8-6:28.

136.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.5 10 (Deering 2006).

137. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 7:5-9 (quoting § 708.510(a)).
138. Id. at 7:10-11.
139. Id. at 7:16-19.
140. Plaintiffs Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 6:2-4.
141. Id. at 6:4-6.
142. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 7:20-22.
143. Id. at 7:22-8:1.
144. Id. at 7:23-8:8 (citing Zanetti v. Zanetti, 77 Cal. App. 2d 553, 560 (Ct. App. 1947)).
145. Id. at 7:23-8:2.
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3. Awarding Simpson's Right of Publicity to Goldman Would Stop
Further Injustice.
Goldman's third argument addresses the seeming injustice of denying
him relief while Simpson exploits his publicity rights for financial
advantage. 146 According to Goldman, Simpson continues to abuse his right
of publicity through the sale of pictures, autographs, and jerseys, as well as
through public appearances. 147 In addition, Simpson has participated in
Juiced, a reality television project in which he mocks the deaths of Ron
Goldman and Nicole Brown.148 Despite generating what Goldman believes
are substantial sums of money from these appearances, Simpson continues to

avoid paying the civil judgment. 149 Goldman claims the only means to
prevent Simpson from evading the judgment is through the transfer and
assignment of his publicity rights. 5 0 Such a transfer would allow Goldman

to bring suit against anyone who used Simpson's name or likeness
commercially, including event organizers and memorabilia manufacturers. 5 '
4.

Any Concern for the "Good" Celebrity Judgment Debtor Is
Misplaced.

Next, Goldman dismisses concerns about the possible precedent set by

this case for "good" celebrity judgment debtors, who through negligent
152
actions find themselves subject to multi-million dollar judgments.

146. Id. at 8:22-10:9.
147. Id. at 8:22-24. Simpson appeared at a horror movie convention in Los Angeles and signed
jerseys, t-shirts, helmets, and photographs for eager fans. O.J. Makes Rare Public Appearance,
CBSNEwS.COM, Oct. 1, 1995, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/l0/0l/entertainment/main
897524.shtml. Autographs were also sold, starting at $95 each. See O.J. Simpson to Make 1st Los
Angeles Public Appearance in More than Twelve Years, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOEIN/is_2005-Sept-28/ain 15651335. The appearance
coincided with the tenth anniversary of his acquittal for the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron
Goldman. Id. In addition, Simpson made an appearance at the National Sports Collectors
Convention in Illinois and signed 115 autographs in shortly over an hour. See Ross Forman,
Collectors Keep Simpson Busy Before Forced Exit, USA TODAY, Aug. 2005,
Fans at the convention
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mikmusa/is_200508/ai_n14845737.
paid between $100 and $125 each for the autographs. Id. Furthermore, after leaving the convention,
Simpson went to a local hotel and signed hundreds more autographs. Id.
148. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 9:22-27. On Juiced, Simpson plays practical
jokes on surprised victims using props from the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, such
as the white Ford Bronco. See O.J. Pulls Bronco Prankfor Pay TV Show, MSNBC.COM, May 15,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12754888. In one stunt, Simpson attempts to sell the Bronco
at a used car lot and tells an interested buyer, "It was good for me-it helped me get away." Id.
149. See Goldmans Seek Control,supra note 27.
150. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 10:1-4.
151. Id. at 10:4-6.
152. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 11:12-15. A 2006 suit involving R&B
singer Brandy provides such an example. Following a December 2006 automobile accident in which

376

[Vol. 35: 347, 2008]

What's in a Name?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

According to Goldman, such a fear assumes that preserving the self-respect
of judgment debtors outweighs making creditors whole again.' 53 By
permitting celebrity debtors to hold onto their publicity rights, the court

denies judgment creditors an important means of satisfying their outstanding
debts. 15 4 Meanwhile, celebrities continue exploiting their publicity rights,

and their debts remain unpaid to the judgment creditor's detriment.

55

If a

celebrity debtor is truly "good," argues Goldman, he or she will use the right
of publicity to pay off the judgment, and thus, remove the need for legal
action. 56
' Alternatively, a "bad" celebrity judgment debtor will refuse to pay
and leave the judgment creditor without remedy. 57
' It is in these situations
that a court should transfer the potentially profitable right of publicity to the

creditor. 58
'

one woman died, Brandy was sued by the woman's parents in a wrongful death action. Brandy
Faces $50 Million Civil Suit, THESHowBUzz.coM Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.showbuzz.cbsnews.
com/stories/2007/01/29/people hotwater/main2409924.shtml.
The parents have asked for $50
million in compensatory and punitive damages.
Id. Subsequently, two additional suits
were filed against Brandy on behalf of the woman's two minor sons and husband.
Ken
Lee, Brandy Faces a Third Wrongful Death Lawsuit, PEOPLE.COM, May 3, 2007,
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20037856,00.html. Brandy's negligent action could end up
costing her millions. If for some reason Brandy were unable to pay the damages, the parents could
pursue her publicity rights. Goldman is addressing the concern about how the precedent set by the
assignment and transfer of Simpson's rights would affect someone "good" like Brandy. Indeed, for
"good" celebrities, the precedent set by awarding Simpson's publicity rights to Goldman would be a
cause for alarm. For most, if not all, celebrities, the ability to make money off their fame is their
most valuable asset. However, such concerns must be balanced against the right of creditors to
collect the judgments they are owed.
153. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 11:18-21. The question is a basic one: in a
debtor-creditor action, whose rights do we prefer? Do we prefer the dignity and reputation of the
debtor or the wholeness of the creditor? An assumption that favors the debtor would be in contrast
to the debtor-creditor system's preference for bringing together all the debtor's assets and making
them available to unpaid creditors. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1340-41. Not only do
legal institutions enforce contract terms between the parties, but they also give creditors the value of
the debtor's unrelated assets. Id. at 1341. Laws establish statutory liens favoring creditors and give
unsecured creditors means to secure the value of a debtor's property. Id. at 1342. As one example, a
judgment creditor may be permitted to garnish the debtor's wages or ask a sheriff to levy the
debtor's property. Id.
154. Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 12:1-4 (citing Jacoby & Zimmerman,
supra note 42).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 12:20-22. A so-called "good" celebrity judgment debtor will make appearances and
endorse products in order to capitalize on the celebrity's fame and generate money for paying the
judgment. Id.
157. Id. at 12:22-23.
158. Id. at 12:23-13:1.

5. The Transfer of Publicity Rights Presents No Significant Logistical
Problems.
Finally, Goldman proposes that a dollar-for-dollar credit against the
judgment be provided for any money generated by Simpson's right of
publicity. 5 9 This method eliminates any court involvement, as a private
accounting process can determine the total revenue created by the publicity

rights and credit the judgment accordingly. 160 Should Simpson dispute
the
61
amount of the credit, he can seek recourse in an appropriate court. 1
B.

O.J.Simpson's Arguments

1. California Statutory Law Does Not Permit the Transfer of Publicity
Rights.

In his response to Goldman's motion, Simpson draws on California's
right-of-publicity statutes in an effort to show that they do not allow the

transfer Goldman requests. 162 California Civil Code sections 3344 and
3344.1 are aimed at preventing the "unauthorized commercial use of name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness."' 163

These five components

comprise a person's identity, a property right. 64 California law allows the
individual and the individual's heirs to license the commercial use of the
individual's persona, and to bring suit against any unauthorized use within
the state. 165

Simpson reasons that the statutes' silence regarding the

assignment and transfer of the right of publicity indicates the legislature did
166
not intend the right to stretch beyond the individual and any heirs.
159. Id. at 13:6-9.
160. Id. at 13:9-17.
161. Id. at 13:12-13.
162. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 4:4-6:12.
163. Id. at 4:4-6; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2006), held preempted in part by federal
CopyrightAct by Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S.Ct. 1371 (2007); see also supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text (discussing section 3344
as part of California's statutory right of publicity).
164. See § 3344.
165. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 4:9-13; see CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1
(Deering 2006).
166. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 4:15-5:2. In his reply brief, Goldman asserts
that section 3344.1 of the California Civil Code expressly recognizes the transferability of the right
of publicity. Plaintiffs Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 8:16-24. Under the statute, publicity
rights can be transferred by contract, trust, or testamentary documents, either before or after the
death of the deceased personality. Id. Despite Goldman's argument, Simpson may have a valid
point. While the statute's language is quite clear in specifying the right of publicity is a freely
transferable property right, it is equally clear in detailing who can transfer the right. See § 3344.1(b).
Before the deceased personality's death, the transfer can be executed by the deceased personality or
by a transferee. Id. After death, the individuals in whom the rights vest or one of their transferees
can undertake the transfer. Id. A judgment creditor does not fall within these categories. Likewise,
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Moreover, only Simpson can decide to form a licensing contract for the
endorsement of a product. 167 The court simply cannot force him to enter
licensing contracts
by assigning or transferring his right of publicity to
68
Goldman. 1

2. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Assign or Transfer Simpson's
Publicity Rights.
Furthermore, Simpson contends the California courts lack jurisdiction to
transfer or assign his right of publicity. 169 For personal property, California
Civil Code section 946 mandates the law of the domicile of the owner
should govern. 170 Because Simpson is currently domiciled in Florida, his
personal property, including his right of publicity, is located in that state. 17'
Therefore, Florida law should control
7 2 the suit because Simpson's right of
publicity moved with him to Florida. 1
section 3344 is silent on issues of assignment and transfer, specifying only that a person must obtain
consent before knowingly using an aspect of a person's identity for a commercial purpose. See §
3344.
167. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 6:8-10. Goldman dismisses the suggestion that
he could indenture Simpson by compelling him to perform an act against his will. Plaintiffs Consol.
Reply, supra note 125, at 10:7-9. As Goldman states, "The right of publicity is a stand alone right
separate and apart from any performance obligation of Simpson. It can be freely exploited with or
without Simpson's cooperation." Id. at 10:10-12. Without Simpson's involvement, the publicity
rights may have less value, but they could still be utilized for such things as t-shirts that do not
require any participation by Simpson. Id. at 10:12-14. Goldman cites to a law review article
offering further support for the rejection of these enslavement concerns:
[S]tate-law created publicity rights are properly understood as purely passive in nature;
any associated right to command active participation by a celebrity should be understood
as arising separately as a result of a specifically negotiated contract term ....
Simply
put, publicity rights, standing alone, do not include the right to direct a person's future
labor.
Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 17:8-11 (quoting Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra
note 42, at 1351-52) (emphasis omitted).
168. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 6:10-12.
169. Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Motion to Transfer and
Assign "Right of Publicity" for Lack of Jurisdiction; Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
Affidavit of Orenthal James Simpson in Support Thereof at 4:18-20, Goldman v. Simpson, No.
SC036340 (L.A. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
170. Id. at 3:11-13; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1025 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (affirming California's choice-of-law rule for personal property as the law of the person's
domicile). Although Simpson frames his argument as a jurisdictional one, Goldman counters that
section 946 is a choice-of-law provision that can only be applied if the California court has
jurisdiction over Simpson. Plaintiffs Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 5:8-20. Florida law cannot
be employed unless the court maintains jurisdiction. Id. at 5:20-22.
171. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 169, at 3:14-16.
172. Id. While a creative argument by Simpson, it does not affect the California court's

379

Under Florida law, individuals can license the commercial use of their
name or likeness while alive. 71 3 However, transfer or assignment of the
right of publicity is permitted only after death. 174 Although Simpson is free
to license his name or likeness and to delineate the scope of any license,
such licensing differs from the wholesale giving away of his right of
publicity. 7' 5
Code of Civil Procedure section 708.5 10, relied on by Goldman, allows
the court to assign payments due solely from property that is already
assignable. 76 Florida law specifically provides that Simpson's right of
17 7
publicity cannot be assigned or transferred except upon his death.
Therefore, a California court does not have the requisite jurisdiction
to
78
require Simpson to appear regarding personal property in Florida.

jurisdiction over him. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.50(b) (Deering 2006). Once California
acquired jurisdiction during the civil trial, it continues regardless of whether Simpson changes
domicile beyond the otherwise applicable jurisdiction of the court. See id.
173. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 169, at 3:17-24; see FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2006). The statute
reads:
(I) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade
or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other
likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use
given by:
(a) Such person; or
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person to license
the commercial use of her or his name or likeness; or
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to
license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or
corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a class composed of her or his
surviving spouse and surviving children.
§ 540.08(1).
174. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 169, at 3:17-24; see also FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (right-ofpublicity statute). Even assuming the court determined Florida law applied, Goldman argues that
state's law supports the assignability of publicity rights. Plaintiffs Consol. Reply, supra note 125,
at 9:8-20. The statute uses words such as "consent" that presuppose the ability to transfer the right.
Id. at 9:8-20. Specifically, section 540.08 permits any use to be made once the right-of-publicity
holder's written consent has been secured. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 15:2416:2. Thus, a court order instructing Simpson to consent to the assignment of his publicity rights is
enforceable even in Florida. Id. at 16:2-4.
175. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 169, at 4:4-7.
176. Id. at 4:8-11. The Legislative Committee Comments to section 708.510 emphasize that the
statute does not make any property assignable that is not already assignable. Id.
177. Id. at4:14-17.
178. Id. Simpson never addresses the personal jurisdiction arguments raised by Goldman: (1)
Once jurisdiction has been acquired over a party, it continues to final judgment and any subsequent
proceedings; (2) Simpson has sufficient contacts with California for its courts to exercise
jurisdiction; and (3) Simpson waived any objections to personal jurisdiction by making a general
appearance. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. While Goldman seeks a court order
over Simpson's person, Simpson appears to focus more on subject matter and in rem jurisdiction.
Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 3:4-5; Plaintiff's Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 2:7-8.
He argues that because the property is located in Florida, the California court lacks the power to
order the assignment. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 7:2-5. Goldman never argues in
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3.

Goldman Is Entitled to the Profits or Payments Simpson Receives

from His Right of Publicity, Not the Right Itself.
In his opposition papers, Simpson also argues that Goldman misapplies
Code of Civil Procedure section 708.510 in his motion.1 79

Far from

sanctioning the outright assignment or transfer of intellectual property rights,
such as patents and copyrights, section 708.510 merely permits the court to
order the payments due from such rights. 80 Even assuming patents and

copyrights are analogous to the right of publicity, Simpson claims Goldman
is entitled to payments Simpson receives from his right of publicity, rather
By gaining control over how Simpson's
than the actual right itself.'
persona is used, Goldman "would have the theoretical right to, among other

name and to disparage his image on billboards
things, change Mr. Simpson's
18 2
across the country."'

rem jurisdiction; instead, his request for a court order requiring Simpson to sign over his publicity
rights draws on in personam jurisdiction. Plaintiff's Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 3:6-7, 11.
179. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 2:20-24; 3:16-21.
180. Id. at 2:20-24.
181. Id. at 3:16-21. The text of the statute explicitly limits judgment debtors to assignment of
payments due from patents or copyrights, rather than the actual patent or copyright itself. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 708.510 (Deering 2006). While Goldman could seek to secure payments generated
by Simpson's right of publicity, this would be a time-consuming and expensive process. Fred
Goldman, Justice Not Served, CBSNEWs.coM, June 9, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/06/07/earlyshow/main621633.shtml. Given Simpson's history of refusing to pay the judgment,
it seems likely he would try to circumvent any attempts by the Goldmans to collect the money. Id.
The hostile antagonism between Goldman and Simpson has continued since the criminal and civil
trials. On the tenth anniversary of his son's murder, Fred Goldman stated he would have liked to see
Simpson given a death sentence. Id. "Having him gone with a needle in his arm would have been
just fine for me. I would have been more than glad to see him die." Id.
182. Opposition of Defendant, supra note 127, at 2:28-3:2. Simpson expresses concern that
Goldman would abuse Simpson's publicity rights, such as requiring Simpson to associate himself
with products that would damage his reputation. Id. at 2:25-3:2. In response, Goldman argues he
would be prevented from engaging in such actions by defamation and privacy laws. Plaintiffs
Supplemental Brief, supra note 130, at 9:7-10. Simpson would be able to take legal action if
Goldman took part in the types of disparaging activities described by Simpson. Id. at 9:10-12.
Controlling Simpson's right of publicity does not somehow invalidate defamation claims. Id.
Furthermore, third-party licensees most likely would be hesitant to participate in such activities out
of fear of retaliation by Simpson. Id. at 9:13-21. Goldman maintains he is not interested in forcing
Simpson to make appearances; rather, Goldman merely wants the ability to control potentially
valuable publicity rights and exploit them in the marketplace through such avenues as manufacturing
and distribution. Id. at 10:1-4.

381

C. The Court Weighs In
1. The Court's Jurisdiction Is Not Defeated by Simpson's Motion.
The court starts its analysis by addressing the jurisdictional issues
presented by Goldman's motion." 3 Once jurisdiction has attached in an
action, California Code of Civil Procedure section 410.50 provides that
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter is maintained throughout later
proceedings.8 4 A party's change in residence or domicile
following the
85
entry ofjudgment does not defeat the court's jurisdiction.
Additionally, the issues raised in Simpson's motion to dismiss result in a
general appearance. 186 Whether an appearance is categorized as general or
special is dependent on the relief sought, not the intent of the party.' 87 An
objection predicated upon a lack of personal jurisdiction is considered by the
court to be a special appearance.'
However, a person requesting relief only
available to an active party in the case is judged to have made a general

appearance. 189
While Simpson's motion to dismiss is framed as a jurisdictional
objection, it is based exclusively upon California Civil Code section 946.'90
This statute is merely a choice-of-law provision establishing that the
disposition of personal property is controlled by the law of an individual's
domicile.' 9' For support, the court relies on Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., a

183. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 2-3.
184. Id. at 2; see CAL. CIV. PROC..CODE § 410.50 (Deering 2006). In his motion, Goldman
argued this very point as part of his three-pronged approach supporting the court's jurisdiction over
the case. Plaintiffs Consol. Reply, supra note 125, at 3:18-19, 4:1-2, 7-8. The court agrees with
Goldman's interpretation of this statute. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
185. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 2. Florida is required to honor the California judgment
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. See supra note 123.
186. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 2. This was another of Goldman's jurisdictional arguments
favoring California. By filing a motion to dismiss along with an opposition, Simpson made a
general appearance and waived any jurisdictional objections. See supra note 125 and accompanying
text.
187. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 2-3; see supra note 127 (giving examples of general and
special appearances).
188. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 946 (Deering 2006).
191. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 3; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 946 and supra note 170
(discussing Goldman's similar argument on this point). This point is valid. Choice-of-law issues
come into play when it is necessary to reconcile the differences between the laws of various states.
See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21 (Cal. 1976). Such issues result in the courts of
one state potentially having to apply the law of a different state. See id. Before a choice-of-law
problem arises, however, the courts first must establish they can exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. See id. A choice-of-law issue does not substitute for a jurisdictional analysis, and,
thus, Simpson's reference to the Cairns case does not answer the question of California's
jurisdiction.
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case involving a postmortem claim of infringement of Princess Diana's right
of publicity. 192 The district court in Cairns held that the establishment of a

postmortem right of publicity did not affect the default choice-of-law rules
in section 946; as a result, the law of Great Britain should control as Princess
Diana's domicile.' 93 In the instant suit, the Cairns decision could not be
extended to defeat the court's jurisdiction. 194 Therefore, the court possessed

jurisdiction to rule on Goldman's motion. 195
2.

California Judgment Law Fails to Support Goldman's Motion.

Moving from questions of jurisdiction to California judgment law, the
court fails to locate any California law explicitly discussing the transfer or
assignment of publicity rights within the context of a money judgment. 196
While the principal case cited by Goldman, Pacific Bank, has never been
overturned, the most recent California citation to it appears in a 1958

decision.' 97 The court finds this lack of recent citation to Pacific Bank
noteworthy, and attributes it in part to the comprehensive statutory scheme
enacted to address defects in the law governing post-judgment

192. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
193. Id. at 1029.
194. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 3.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 4-5.
197. Id. at 5. Goldman devotes a large portion of his original motion to excerpts from Pacific
Bank and uses it to support his contention that the right of publicity can be transferred or assigned.
Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 5:2-6:28; see also supra notes 133-35 and accompanying
text. Although the case dealt with patents, Goldman compares the right of publicity to other
intangible rights. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at 5:2-6:28. As noted by the current
court, Burrows v. Jorgenson is the 1958 case referencing Pacific Bank. Court Ruling, supra note
123, at 5 (citing Burrows v. Jorgenson, 323 P.2d 150, 154-155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)). In analyzing
Burrows, the court explains,
Burrows did not address the propriety of assigning intangible property in its entirety, but
for the more limited purpose of affirming the authority of a court to appoint a receiver in
the post-enforcement context to conserve profits (there, rental income) pending the
decision of a court upon the purported fraudulent transfer of leaseholds aimed at
shielding them from enforcement of a default judgment.
Id. The court finds this lack of authority referencing Pacific Bank to be significant in light of the
enactment of section 708.5 10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and notes a recent federal
case that rejects the outright assignment approach of Pacific Bank in favor of the constraints of
section 708.510. Id. at 6-7 (citing Sleepy Hollow Inv. Co., No. 2 v. Prototek, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35479 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2006)). In Sleepy Hollow, the plaintiff sought a court order
assigning it, as the judgment creditor, title to selected patents of Prototek, in order to satisfy a
judgment. Id. at 2. Alternatively, plaintiff moved for the assignment of Prototek's right to payment
under the patents. Id. Although the court rejected the request for outright assignment of the patents,
it ordered the assignment to plaintiff of Prototek's right to payment from the patents. See id. at 6-7.

enforcements.' 98 A part of this major revision was California Code of Civil
Procedure section 708.510.'99 This provision empowers the court to order a
judgment debtor to assign to a receiver or a judgment creditor the right to
payment due from such intangibles as commissions, royalties, and payments
from patents or copyrights.20 0 Accordingly, the language of section 708.510
serves to strictly limit any assignment to the right to payment due.2 ' It does
not authorize the outright assignment or transfer of the specified

intangibles. 202
The court next discusses the practical challenges of assigning the right
of publicity to satisfy a money judgment and raises a number of potential
questions. 203 Among them are the following: (1) Must the court perform an
auditing function in tracking credits against the judgment? (2) Would the
assignee be entitled to file suit against third parties who infringe upon a
celebrity's publicity rights? (3) Finally, is assignment a customary remedy
in the post-judgment enforcement context, or must the exhaustion of all
other means of enforcement be shown? 2°4 While the court does not provide
answers to these questions, it finds these issues attest to the wisdom of
section 708.510.205 As a result, the court determines that the law as
presently written does not support the assignment and transfer of Simpson's
publicity rights.20 6
3.

California's Right of Publicity for Living Celebrities Differs from
the Postmortem Right.

The court ends its ruling by making an important distinction between the
right-of-publicity protection given to living persons and deceased
personalities under California law.20 7 Goldman's motion is premised upon
the right of publicity as property. 0 8 While assignable during life, an

198. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 5-6.
199. The legislative history of the statute reveals it was intended to provide a new procedure for
reaching certain types of property not subject to execution. Legislative Committee Comment, CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.510 (Deering 2006). This remedy can be used either by itself or in
combination with other remedies for reaching fights to payments. Id.
200. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.510.
201. Court Ruling, supranote 123, at 6; see supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
202. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 6; see supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
203. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 7.
204. Id. at 7-8. Some of the concerns raised by the court, dealing with the practicalities of the
transfer of publicity rights as a remedy, will be taken up in Part VI of this Comment. See infra notes
268-77 and accompanying text.
205. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 8.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 8-12.
208. Id. at 8-9. Goldman finds support for treating publicity rights as property in section 695.010
of the California Code of Civil Procedure. This provision specifies that the entirety of the judgment
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attribute of property, the inter vivos right of publicity is equally defined by
privacy rights that weigh against any court-enforced transfer. 20 9 The court
points out there are important differences between California's inter vivos
right of publicity and its postmortem counterpart." ° In Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, a case decided prior to the enactment of section 3344.1, the
California Supreme Court held that the protected right to exploit a person's
identity had to be utilized during life and did not extend to one's heirs or
In its analysis, the California Supreme Court engaged in a
successors.
discussion of the nature of the inter vivos right of publicity that is still
applicable. Rather than concentrating on property concepts, the court
focused on a common-law right included within privacy law.2t2 Lugosi's
right to license the use of his persona for commercial purposes, or to choose
to not do so, was a right personal to him. 21 3 Thus, the trial court had erred in
finding that his name and likeness were property.21 4 Because the right to
who
refuse commercial exploitation is a personal one, there are celebrities
215
have chosen not to allow any use of their fame commercially.
In contrast to other states where privacy rights arise from common law,
California's right of privacy emanates from the state constitution and has
been deemed to be more protective than the analogous federal privacy
right.21 6 As a result, the court in the Goldman v.Simpson suit concludes it is
debtor's property is subject to enforcement of a money judgment.

See supra note 130 and

accompanying text.
209. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 9.
210. Id.; see also supra notes 86-121 and accompanying text (contrasting the right of publicity
during the celebrity's lifetime with the postmortem right).
211. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 9 (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813
(1979)). Lugosi later was superseded by section 3344.1 of the California Civil Code which provides
for a postmortem right of publicity. Id.
212. Id. at 10 (citing Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819).
213. Id. (citing Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 820-21).
214. Id. (citing Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824).
215. Some examples include performers Bette Midler and Tom Waits as well as actor Dustin
Hoffman. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (commenting on
Midler's refusal to do television commercials); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th
Cir. 1992) (noting that Waits refused profitable product endorsements because Waits "has expressed
his philosophy that musical artists should not do commercials because it detracts from their artistic
integrity"); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 870 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(determining that Dustin Hoffman's name and likeness have value "not only because of Mr.
Hoffman's stature as an actor, but because he does not knowingly permit commercial uses of his
identity ... [Hoffman] maintains a strict policy of not endorsing commercial products for fear that
he will be perceived in a negative light by his peers and motion picture industry executives"), revd
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 11. California's protection of the right of privacy is
evidenced by looking at the beginning of the state Constitution. Article 1,section 1 provides: "All

not surprising California differentiates between the personal right of a
celebrity during the celebrity's lifetime and the property right passing to
survivors upon the celebrity's death.21 7 In extending Lugosi, the court wams

against "turn[ing] a man into a commodity and mak[ing] him serve the
economic needs and interest of others... against his will." 2t5
Admittedly, the court acknowledges, Simpson has exploited his fame by

participating in "slasher" conventions where videos glorify acts of violence
resembling those that resulted in the murder of Ron Goldman. 219 However,

the transfer of the right of publicity based upon post-judgment conduct raises
serious concerns in the court's view. 220 A judgment creditor's right to sell,

license, and use the celebrity's identity may need to be separated from the
performance right of the celebrity. 22' Otherwise, allowing a judgment
creditor to control the celebrity's appearances may constitute involuntary
servitude.222
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. In contrast, the federal Constitution has no
explicit provision ensuring a constitutional right of privacy. In the Fifth Amendment to the Bill of
Rights, the text states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Likewise, in the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
protection is offered with regard to state governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Federal cases
such as Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973), that safeguard an individual's privacy rights in the area of reproduction find such a right
implied within the liberty protection of these two amendments. The breadth of the California
privacy protection as compared to its federal counterpart can be seen by examining the way privacy
rights have been interpreted by California and federal courts, respectively. In Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 780 (Cal. 1981), the California Supreme Court had to
determine the validity of state Budget Act provisions that denied indigent women public funding of
medical expenses if they aborted the child while providing full funding if the same women decided
to continue the pregnancy. A U.S. Supreme Court decision, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
was relied upon by the state of California in defending the Budget Act provision. Myers, 625 P.2d at
781. In Harris,a similar funding scheme was at issue, under which the federal government failed to
fund medical expenses of women choosing to have an abortion while paying the expenses of those
women continuing the pregnancy. Harris, 448 U.S. at 302. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the funding scheme under the federal Constitution. Id. at 317-18. However, in Myers, the
California court found the federal precedent was not controlling and under the state Constitution, the
inequitable funding scheme violated a pregnant woman's right to privacy. Myers, 625 P.2d at 79899.
217. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 11.
218. Id. (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000-03 (1964)).
219. Id. at 12; see also Blankstein, supra note 126 (reporting on Simpson's appearance at a horror
convention).
220. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 12.
221. Id. In arguing for the inclusion of publicity rights in the assets of a debtor, law professors
Jacoby and Zimmerman recognize such a step will require disentangling the property and personal
interests that comprise the right of publicity. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1350.
222. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 12. Simpson voiced a variation of the involuntary servitude
argument in his opposition papers. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. Simpson
claimed that in California it is only the celebrity who can decide whether or not to form a licensing
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Based upon the sparse statutory and case law, the court determines that
the outright transfer of a judgment debtor's inter vivos right of publicity
finds no support in either the law or the223court's equitable authority; as a
result, the court dismisses Goldman's suit.
V. CRITIQUE

The court in the Goldman v. Simpson suit reaches a sound decision and
one that is in line with the current state of the law. The assignment of

publicity rights is not currently recognized in California as a means of
Although California Code of Civil
satisfying a money judgment.224
Procedure section 708.510 authorizes a court to order the assignment of the
right to payments due from intangibles such as patents, it does not sanction

the outright assignment or transfer of these same intangibles. 225 Admittedly,
Goldman may have a remedy in seeking any payments Simpson receives as

a result of his publicity rights.226 However, the antagonism that has
characterized the relationship between Goldman and Simpson since the
criminal trial would make this process expensive, time-consuming, and
likely unsuccessful.227 Unfortunately, the remedy Goldman seeks does not
find support in California law. As the court concludes, the lack of statutory

contract for product promotion. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. The court cannot
compel Simpson to enter such a contract. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
223. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 13.
224. See supra notes 196-202, 223 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
227. The historic hostility between Goldman and Simpson has continued, as evidenced by
Simpson's remarks in an interview with NBC's Katie Couric on the tenth anniversary of the
murders.
See Katie Couric, O.J. Simpson: Ten Years Later, MSNBC, June 18, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5137198/ (giving a transcript of the interview between Couric and
Simpson). Simpson refuses to pay the Goldman family because he maintains he is innocent of the
murders. Id. He remarks: "I didn't do the crime. I'm not going to pay them a dime. And that's the
name of that tune, you know." Id. Later in the same interview, Simpson states that he believes the
Goldmans deserve nothing. Id. "I'm not paying a penny, I'm not doing nothing that the law doesn't
dictate me to do. I followed the law to the letter. If it means giving [the Goldman family] money for
something I didn't do, I won't work. I make no bones about this." Id. Likewise, Goldman hardly
minces words when discussing his anger at Simpson's refusal to pay the judgment. See 10 Years,
supra note 14. "Honestly, what would you expect different from a liar, a wife-beater and a
murderer? Would you expect him to be honorable? He's never going to do ... the manly, honest
thing. As long as he's alive is another day and another month and another year that a murderer
walks unpunished." Id. Given the anger that still exists between the two, an order for Simpson to
turn over payments generated from his right of publicity seems unlikely to be followed willingly.

assignment of
and case law on point weighs
22 1 against ordering the transfer and
rights.
publicity
Simpson's
The court acknowledges the injustice that seemingly compels a different
outcome. 229 Denying Goldman relief while Simpson continues to exploit his
fame sends the message that the satisfaction of the creditor is less important
than the debtor's reputation and dignity.230 The law needs to advance and
permit the assignment and transfer of publicity rights to unpaid creditors.
While so-called "good" celebrity judgment debtors may be concerned
by such a precedent, it is these types of debtors who will use their fame to
make payments on the judgment, not to circumvent it. 23 Without such a
post-judgment remedy, celebrity debtors like Simpson will be able to
prevent creditors from securing the most valuable asset, the celebrity's fame.
VI.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: IMPACT OF GOLDMAN V. SIMPSON FOR
CELEBRITIES

The Goldman motion asking the court to order the assignment and
transfer of Simpson's right of publicity raises several interesting questions
that could arise in a future suit involving another celebrity judgment debtor.
Each of these questions will be discussed in turn because the answers could
have significant consequences for how publicity rights are treated in the
coming years.
At the start, it is important to recognize such an assignment and transfer
would place publicity rights in the context of the debtor-creditor system by
regarding them as an asset subject to seizure by an unpaid creditor.232
Indeed, commentators have argued that the right of publicity should be
treated like other intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, and
trademarks.233 Such a view would mean celebrity debtors would possess a
lucrative asset in their identities that could be transferred or assigned to a
creditor.23

228. See supra notes 196-202, 223 and accompanying text.
229. Court Ruling, supra note 123, at 12.
230. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 134041 ("The debtor-creditor system exhibits a
preference for marshalling nearly all assets and making them available to satisfy unpaid creditors,
regardless of any discomfort and indignity the process inflicts on the debtor.").
231. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
232. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1322.
233. See id. at 134445.
234. See id. at 1322-23.
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A.

Does the Right ofPublicity Include only the Celebrity's Identifying
Characteristicsor Does It Encompass Aspects of Performance by the
Famous Person?

One concern raised by the Goldman suit is defining precisely what the
creditor would acquire from this type of assignment and transfer. Would the
creditor merely obtain the ability to use the celebrity debtor's name or
likeness, or would the creditor also gain the ability to ask the celebrity
debtor to make public appearances? 35 Placing publicity rights into the
debtor-creditor framework requires separating out the personal interests
from the property interests intrinsic in the right of publicity.2 36 Because the
right of publicity is a property right that can be valuable without any
celebrity involvement,3237
the celebrities' future services are not a part of
8
their publicity rights.1
Even assuming publicity rights included the ability to force the celebrity
debtor to perform at the creditor's request, enforcing such an interest would
be difficult due to involuntary servitude concerns. 239 Any performance
would be for the benefit of the creditor who would control the celebrity
debtor's future labors. 240 This type of coerced personal service is disfavored
235. See id. at 1350.
236. Seeid. at 1323.
237. Many of the most profitable publicity rights, such as those of Fred Astaire, are completely
passive in nature. See id. at 1352. Because Astaire is dead, he can hardly be expected to personally
take part in any new type of commercial exploitation of his identity. See id. Nevertheless, his
attributes, name, and existing images are still usable without Astaire having to do anything. See id.
238. An example emphasizing this point is offered by commentators:
In a voluntary transaction, the purchaser or licensee of another's publicity rights might
bargain to obtain both the ability to use a celebrity's name or likeness and the ability to
call on the celebrity to perform in future commercials or to make public appearances on
behalf of a product or service. The parties may not be concerned with articulating
whether the publicity right covers both the use of his identity and of the celebrity's labor.
But if, for example, Michael Jordan's publicity rights were sold to a third party to satisfy
creditors' claims, the purchaser ought not to expect that she could require Jordan to travel
around the country to promote a new energy drink as its official spokesperson.
Id. at 1351. While this example is in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, it is still relevant to a
debtor-creditor situation such as the civil judgment owed by Simpson.
239. See id. at 1352. Slavery and involuntary servitude are banned by the Thirteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1352 n.166. This amendment reads, "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,
§ 1. Passed in the aftermath of the Civil War, the amendment generally applies in situations of race
discrimination. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1352 n.166. While never explicitly
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the amendment suggests all citizens are protected from
involuntary servitude. Id.
240. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1352.
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in contract law as evidenced by the law's aversion to personal service
contracts.24'
The ability to exploit publicity rights without the celebrity's active
participation, combined with the law's dislike of compelled personal
performance, lends credence to the argument that a celebrities' services are
not a component of their publicity rights.24 2 Moreover, the right of publicity
can be included as one of the debtor's assets while still allowing control over
future labor to be maintained by the celebrity debtor.243
B.

What Would Be the Impact of Such an Assignment and Transfer on the
Celebrity's FutureEarning Capacity?

Once the celebrity debtor's right of publicity is assigned or transferred
to a creditor, the celebrity must abstain from trying to exploit it so as not to
be an infringer. 244 While it might be tempting to enter contracts for
advertisements or product promotions, the celebrity would be unable to do
so without competing directly with the creditor and negating the value of the
publicity rights. 245 This problem of celebrities infringing on publicity rights
transferred to other people is not unique to the debtor-creditor situation and
has occurred in other areas.246

One possible difficulty is defining the activities that infringe on the
publicity rights. 247 Future activities will need to be evaluated to determine
whether the celebrity's activities are "appropriate uses of human capital or
are inappropriate attempts to exploit publicity rights that the celebrity no
longer owns or controls. '248 This249type of determination, although complex,
is common in infringement suits.
Another difficulty is posed by the fact that celebrities who have parted
with their publicity rights will be limited in the ways they can produce
income. 2 " However, the celebrity and creditor could work together to find

241. See id. at 1354. Traditional contract law does not compel the performance of personal
service contracts, even if the agreement was entered voluntarily. Id. Rather than specific
performance, a party can only gain monetary damages as a remedy. Id.
242. Id. at 1355.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 1355-56.
246. Id. at 1356 (citing Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914)); see also Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding a baseball player could
not transfer exclusive rights to his image and then grant those same rights to another party).
247. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1356.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
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" '
the most worthwhile means of using the publicity rights.25

Perhaps the

creditor could negotiate with the celebrity to secure a personal appearance
that would result in a valuable benefit for both parties.
C. What Effect Does the Assignment and Transfer ofPublicity Rights Have
on Celebrities' Control over Their Identities?
Forced assignment and transfer of publicity rights allows the creditor
absolute control over how those rights are used and what commercial
associations are made with the celebrity's identity. 252 The court in Halean

held that a property designation for celebrity personas made sense because it
believed famous people only wanted to make money from their notoriety.253
The court did not foresee celebrities defending themselves against the
exploitation of their identities because they desired to safeguard their
privacy.25 4 Because publicity rights have never entirely abandoned their
privacy origins, however, the familiar tension between privacy and property

is implicated by the possibility of transferring publicity rights to a creditor
for the satisfaction of debts.255
Rather than exploiting the right of publicity to generate money, some
celebrities may choose to enforce their rights by preventing all commercial
uses of their personas. 56 Other celebrities, while not wanting to prohibit all
commercial uses, may desire some level of control over how their identities
are exploited.257 Celebrities may not want to risk overexposure or associate
themselves with questionable products or companies. 2 58
Moreover,
celebrities may have a personal objection to a product. 259 The courts have

251. Id. at 1357.
252. See id. at 1358.
253. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
254. See id.
255. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1358-59.
256. Id. at 1359. An early case in which the right of publicity was used defensively to prevent
commercial exploitation involved an objection to the sale of plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King.
See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697
(Ga. 1982). The court held that publicity rights had an important role for those who did not want
their image used commercially. Id.; see also supra note 215 (discussing other examples involving
Bette Midler, Tom Waits, and Dustin Hoffman).
257. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1359-60.
258. Id. at 1360.
259. Id. Former Dodger pitcher Don Newcome objected to a Coors beer advertisement featuring a
drawing of a person resembling him. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir.
1998). His protest to the advertisement stemmed from the fact he was a recovering alcoholic who
campaigned about the dangers of alcohol as a spokesperson for the National Institute on Drug and

held that publicity rights protect not only economic interests, but also these
dignitary and reputational ones.26
Those opposed to the assignment and transfer of the right of publicity
argue that the right is unique in its implication of these personal-dignity and
reputation interests. 261 Such critics point out that "certain forms of wealth
may be seen as so intimately connected to the human psyche that it would be
morally offensive to permit creditors free reign in exploiting them after the
debtor has failed to pay. 262 By forcing celebrity debtors to surrender
control of their identities to creditors, who possess the ability to connect the
celebrity with unwanted ventures, the right of association arguably is
violated.263
While some states, including Illinois, have passed laws exempting
publicity rights entirely from the debtor-creditor system,2 4 such exemptions
are based on the erroneous belief that protecting debtors' interests in
reputation is more important than securing relief for creditors. 265 Indeed,
placing publicity rights outside the reach of creditors also conveys the
message that such rights favor the famous at the expense of the creditor
seeking relief.266 Ultimately, "the question is whether it is reasonable and
fair to create a form of property that is legally cognizable only when it
favors the famous or their assigns, but not when the benefits of doing so
would flow to... people to whom a celebrity owes money. 267
D. How is the Court to Deal with the PracticalDifficulties Createdby an
Assignment of the Right of Publicityin the Context ofa Money
Judgment?
In its ruling, the Simpson court raises a number of concerns regarding
the practicalities of assigning or transferring publicity rights in the money
judgment context. The first is whether the court would be required to
assume an auditing role in monitoring credits against the judgment. 268
Goldman suggests a dollar-for-dollar credit against the judgment be
provided for monies created by Simpson's publicity rights.2 69 While a

Alcohol Abuse. Id. While considered more of a dignitary, rather than economic, interest, the court
decided in his favor. Id. at 694.
260. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1360.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 1361.
263. Id. at 1360.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
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Id. at 1361 n.195 (citing 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/15 (West 2002)).
See id. at 1361.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1367.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing Goldman's proposal for court
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private accounting process could calculate and track the total revenue
generated, it is likely that some court supervision would be necessary,
perhaps in the form of an annual accounting of the amount remaining on the
judgment. Such an administrative role may further add to the burdens on
overcrowded courts,27 ° especially if the celebrity debtor contests the amount
of a credit. In such a situation, a hearing would need to be held to give the
celebrity debtor the opportunity to voice his objections and obtain a court
ruling.
The second difficulty is whether the person to whom the publicity rights
are assigned would be permitted to bring suit against third parties infringing
on the celebrity's likeness.2 7'
The assignment of publicity rights would presumably give a creditor the
ability to sue any infringers. 72 For example, if a manufacturer sold t-shirts
with Simpson's picture on them, without consent, Goldman would be
entitled to seek any money made from the merchandise. Such actions would
require additional time and resources on the part of the creditor.
Furthermore, the assignment of publicity rights would not deprive celebrity
debtors of legal remedies against blatant misuses of their identities. 273 The
celebrities would retain the right to bring defamation claims if their images
were disparaged by the creditor or others. 74
A third question is whether assignment of publicity rights would be a
routine post-judgment remedy or whether it would be offered only upon a
showing that all other enforcement mechanisms failed to secure the
judgment. 7 5 If such an assignment is allowed as a matter of course,

administration of the judgment).
270. As an example, Goldman's suit was filed in the Santa Monica courthouse of the Los Angeles
Superior Court. Simpson Retains Rights, supra note 29. As the largest trial court in the United
States, the Los Angeles County Superior Court has over fifty courthouses, almost 600 judicial
officers, and more than 5,000 staff. Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT ANN. REP. 2006 5 (2006),
http://lasuperiorcourt.org/courtnews/uploads/14200628112158annualreport2006.pdf.
In the year
2006 alone, 2,647,346 cases were filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Id. Court
supervision in the form of an annual accounting to track the amount remaining on a judgment would
present administrative challenges given the already large volume of cases flowing through the court
system.
271. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
272. Indeed, this argument is one raised by Goldman. Motion for Assignment, supra note 128, at
10:4-6. A transfer of Simpson's publicity rights would allow Goldman to bring suit against anyone

who used Simpson's name or likeness commercially, including event organizers and memorabilia
manufacturers. Id.
273. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1362.
274. Id.
275. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.

creditors may seek this potentially profitable remedy without considering
other options for judgment collection that are easier for the courts to execute.
While a celebrity's identity may indeed be worth millions, the concerns over
involuntary servitude and compelled performance27 6 would suggest that
other remedies should be employed first. If these are shown to be
ineffective, however, the assignment of publicity rights should be an option
at the creditor's disposal, particularly when the celebrity has deliberately
circumvented paying the debt as Simpson has done.277
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Through the years, the treatment of fame has shifted from that of a
purely personal characteristic to that of a commodity. 78 This process has
resulted in new forms of wealth for celebrities who create valuable identities
that can be exploited for a profit. 279 States increasingly have recognized the
right of publicity through common law, statute, or a combination of both.28°
Yet, those advocating for more expansive publicity rights may not have
considered the consequences of assigning property status to an interest.
When fame is turned into a commodity, the possibility arises of treating it as
an asset within the debtor-creditor context. As the court hearing the
Goldman motion correctly ruled, the assignment of publicity rights is not
currently recognized by the law as a means of satisfying a money
judgment. 281 However, this remedy should be available to unpaid creditors
to collect the debt owed to them.
The case of Fred Goldman and O.J. Simpson presents a particularly
poignant example of the need for such measures. Despite being found liable
by a civil jury for the death of Ron Goldman,282 Simpson continues to
exploit his fame and defiantly refuses to pay the judgment owed.283 By not
allowing Goldman to acquire Simpson's publicity rights, the court
seemingly sacrifices the satisfaction of the creditor for the sake of the
debtor's reputation and dignity. This is particularly true when the creditor
has exhausted other available forms of judicial relief, as Goldman has done

276. See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text (commenting on whether the right of
publicity includes elements of performance).
277. The court in Goldman v. Simpson seems to suggest this is a better remedy when dealing with
estates rather than with living persons due to the personal and privacy rights implicated. Court
Ruling, supra note 123, at 9-11.
278. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 1322.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the ways Simpson continues to use
his publicity rights to turn a profit).

[Vol. 35: 347, 2008]

What's in a Name?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

since the judgment was awarded in 1997.284
However, it must be
acknowledged that the right of publicity presents certain difficulties in this
context. Chief among them is the need to balance the right of the creditor to

use a celebrity's identity with the celebrity's right to the benefits of the
celebrity's future labor. 28'
Nevertheless, these challenges should be
overcome and creditors should be afforded relief, especially when they have
waited, as Goldman has, nearly ten years to receive the judgment.
While there is a renewed sense of hope following a court ruling
awarding Goldman the royalties from Simpson's past movie and television
work,2 6 the civil judgment is still far from satisfied. 287 Goldman has long

284. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (detailing the variety of suits and legal measures
Goldman has pursued to collect the civil judgment).
285. See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text. The possible violation of associational
rights and the administrative burdens caused by this remedy are other areas of concern. See supra
notes 252-77 and accompanying text.
286. See Goldmans Get Royalties, supra note 122. Despite the failure to secure Simpson's
publicity rights, Goldman has initiated other legal proceedings in both California and Florida courts
in an attempt to collect the judgment. While these court actions have continued the rollercoaster ride
for Goldman, there may finally be reason for optimism, as evidenced by the award of royalties. In
February 2007, in a somewhat ironic move, the Goldmans sought the rights to If I Did It and
prepared to auction the book as a means of partially satisfying the civil judgment. Chris Francescani
& Brian Cohen, Role Reversal in Battle Over O.J. Simpson Book, ABCNEws.coM, Apr. 3, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3002369&page=l [hereinafter Role Reversal]. The plan struck
many observers as curious because only months earlier the Goldmans had publicly decried the
publication of the book. Id. Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Gerald Rosenberg sided with the
Goldmans and set the auction for April 17, 2007, in Sacramento, the California headquarters of
publisher HarperCollins. O.J. 's "If I Did It" to be Sold at Auction, BOSTON.COM, March 14, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/articles/2007/03/14/ojs-ifi did itto_be_soldat auction/?m;
Role Reversal, supra. The proposed sale, however, had problems from the start. Role Reversal,
supra. Simpson lawyer Yale Galanter said that Lorraine Brooke Associates, the company created to
receive the profits from the book and television interview deal, was not served properly. Id. Also,
the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, charged with carrying out the auction, wrote a letter
questioning the department's jurisdiction over the Florida-based company. Id. To make matters
worse, the alliance between the Brown and Goldman families was broken as Denise Brown vocally
opposed the auction and the Goldmans' new plan to seek publication of the book. Id. She stated:
"The Goldmans' sudden reversal of positions to justify the auction of these rights ... is transparent
to their true motive, which is to collect money . . . . This overzealous pursuit to collect on the
judgment does not morally justify a means to the end." Id. Finally, days before the scheduled
auction, attorneys for Lorraine Brooke Associates announced it was filing for bankruptcy, putting
the auction on hold until a later date. Greg Risling, O.J. Simpson Book Rights Auction on Hold,
ABCNEWS.COM, Apr. 16, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory?id=3045031.
Lorraine Brooke Associates is owned by Simpson's four children and has long been considered by
Goldman to be a sham operation designed to hide the supposed $880,000 received from the book
and television deal from ever being seized. Id. In the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding, Florida judge
A. Jay Cristol ruled that Lorraine Brooke Associates should be liquidated and the book's rights given
to an independent trustee. Laura Wides-Munoz, Company Trustee Has O.J. Book Rights,
ABCNEwS.COM, May 17, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3186921.
Furthermore,

believed that Simpson's notoriety helped the football star avoid a guilty
verdict in the criminal case.2 88 In an ironic turn of events, it is this very
same fame Goldman hopes to capitalize on to secure the judgment long
overdue. Unless the assignment of publicity rights is recognized as a postjudgment remedy, Goldman may never receive the "poetic justice"2 89 that
has eluded him for over a decade.

all copies of the book, including manuscripts, excerpts, and summaries were ordered by Judge
Cristol to be turned over to avoid any unauthorized distribution. Company Ordered to Turn Over
O.J. Book, ABCNEwS.COM, May 26, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3215552.
After a deposition by Simpson's daughter Arnelle, who heads Lorraine Brooke Associates, Judge
Cristol ordered the rights to "If I Did It" to be given to the Goldman family. Chris Francescani &
Brittany Bacon, "'If I Did It': O.J.s Daughter's Idea, ABCNEwS.COM, June 15, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=32821 10&page=l. The judge accused Simpson of setting
up Lorraine Brooks Associates, named after his children, as a means to defraud creditors. Id. This
June 15, 2007, ruling allows Fred Goldman to auction off the book rights to the highest bidder and
keep the proceeds. Id. On July 3, 2007, the Goldman family purchased the book rights from the
bankruptcy trustee appointed by the court back in May. Goldman Family Buys Rights to O.J Book,
MSNBC.coM, July 3, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19581585/#storyContinued. As part of
the settlement, the Goldmans own the copyright, media, and movie rights as well as Simpson's
name, likeness, and right of publicity connected with the book. Id. Additionally, the trustee receives
ten percent of the first $4 million in gross proceeds generated and then a designated percentage of
any additional proceeds. Id. The book rights will be held by Ron Goldman LLC. Id. Following the
sale by the trustee, Goldman attorney David Cook declared, "Ron Goldman LLC will own
Simpson's name, likeness, signature and story and will hawk it to satisfy this terrible judgment.
Justice has arrived in Miami." Id. This statement evidences the hostility still present between the
Goldman family and Simpson, even ten years after the civil judgment. Not surprisingly, the sale of
the book rights has generated additional questions and issues. The family of Nicole Brown insists
it should receive forty percent of any book proceeds, with the remainder given to the
Goldman family. Browns Seek Piece of Simpson's 'If I Did It,' CNN.COM, July 12, 2007,
The Brown
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/07/12/simpson.book.ap/index.html?iref-newssearch.
family maintains, "Fred Goldman and the Browns are equal judgment creditors," and thus, both
families should share in the profits. Id. However, the Goldmans along with the trustee claim the
Browns should only recover after the Goldmans' claim has been satisfied. Id. Furthermore, lawyers
for Simpson maintain that his name and likeness and the use of them should not be given to the
Goldmans as part of the deal. Id. In response, the Goldmans contend the book would be worthless if
Simpson's name could not be used. Id. In a court hearing held on July 30, 2007, Judge Cristol
approved the settlement with the trustee, clearing the way for the publication of the book. Patrick
Oppmann & Susan Candiotti, O.J.'s book proceeds will go to Goldmanfamily, CNN.CoM, July 30,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/07/30/simpson.book/index.html. The judge also denied the
Brown family's claim to a higher percentage of the proceeds. Id. The book, retitled If I Did It:
Confessions of the Killer, was published in September 2007 by Beaufort Books. Sales soar for
Simpson's "If I Did It," CNN.coM, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/SHOWBIZ/
books/09/19fbooks.simpson.ap/index.html.
In a separate legal maneuver by Goldman, a Los
Angeles judge ordered Simpson to give any money a Florida lawyer is holding for him to the
L.A. Judge Gives O.J. Funds to Goldmans, ABCNEwS.COM, May 23, 2007,
Goldmans.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/ wireStory?id=3207397. Approximately $3,500 is believed to be held for
Simpson in a client trust account in Florida. Id. While a small amount, the move is significant
because the ruling reaches across state lines to money in Florida. Id.
287. See supra notes 27, 122 and accompanying text.
288. Simpson's Image, supranote 28.
289. Id. To this day, Goldman maintains that Simpson murdered his son and has stated it would
be "poetic justice" to take away Simpson's fame. Id.
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VIII. EPILOGUE

Following the writing of this article, a noteworthy amendment was made
to the framework for postmortem publicity rights in California. Senate Bill
771 was passed by the California legislature on September 7, 2007, and later
signed into law on October 10, 2007.290 The bill's purpose is to clarify
California Civil Code section 3344.1 by offering retroactive protection to the
publicity rights of celebrities who died before 1985, the date of the statute's
original passage. 2 9 ' The changes to section 3344.1 specify that the property
rights in the deceased personality are freely transferable by contract, trust, or
other testamentary instrument, even if executed before 1985.292 The rights
vest in the persons specified by the testamentary instrument in effect at the
deceased personality's death.293
If the instrument contains no express
provision transferring the publicity rights, any provision disposing of the
residue of the deceased personality's assets will guide the transfer of the
rights.294 Any contract entered into by the deceased personality during life
for the assignment of publicity rights is also valid. 295 Furthermore, in order
for heirs listed in the previous version of the statute to retain their publicity
rights, the rights must have been exercised by May 1, 2007.296 In the
absence of any action by the statutory heirs, the rights will vest in the heirs

290. 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 439 (West).
291. See id. Under the prior version of section 3344.1, postmortem publicity rights were
recognized as of January 1, 1985, the date of the statute's passage. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344.1(h)
(Deering 2006). A celebrity who died before 1985 could not transfer by testamentary instrument
publicity rights that did not yet exist. Only statutorily included heirs, such as a surviving spouse,
children, grandchildren, or parents could exercise such rights. § 3344.1(d).
292. 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 439 (West).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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specified in any testamentary instrument, in accordance with the newly
amended version of section 3344. 1.297
8
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